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SECOND AMENDMENT REALISM
Michael R. Ulrich†

In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court declared a
constitutionally protected individual right to keep and bear arms. Subsequently, the
scope of the right has been hotly debated, resulting in circuit splits and lingering
questions about what, exactly, the right entails. Despite these splits, the Court has
denied certiorari to the myriad gun cases to land on its doorstep. But the balance of
the Court has shifted and, so too, has its willingness to hear these cases. Among the
most pressing questions in Second Amendment jurisprudence is the constitutionality
of public carry restrictions. With the Court set to rule on Second Amendment
protections beyond the home, the issue demands scrutiny not simply for the outcome
but for how the Justices consider the question in light of a growing gun violence
epidemic. This Article argues against a rights-as-trumps approach that focuses on
history, instead using a population-based perspective to shift the focus from the scope
of the right and properly place the rights and liberties of the general public into the
equation. This Article uses public health law principles, such as social determinants,
balancing the protection of the public with safeguarding individual rights, and
empirics, to examine the true burden on self-defense in comparison to the state’s
ability to protect the wider community. In doing so, this analysis proposes a
constitutional approach anchored in the realities of our time as opposed to
competing historical research methodologies, which more appropriately respects
both the individual right declared in Heller and the state’s interest in protecting its
citizens from a public health crisis.
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INTRODUCTION
In granting certiorari for New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v.
Bruen, the Supreme Court seems poised to finally address whether and
to what degree the Second Amendment exists in the public sphere.1
With District of Columbia v. Heller focused on the Second Amendment
right in the home, evaluating the right in the public sphere is the logical
next step.2 Despite all its opacity, Heller appears to indicate that a total
ban on carrying firearms in public is unconstitutional.3 In an attempt to
balance the interests of the public and Second Amendment rights, some
cities and states have limited carrying firearms in public to those who

141 S. Ct. 2566 (2021) (mem.) (cert. granted).
Rogers v. Grewal, 140 S. Ct. 1865, 1867–68 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (finding the
circuit split over the right to public carry means “it is clearly time for us to resolve the issue”).
3 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008) (finding the D.C. handgun
ban unconstitutional under any standard of review).
1
2

And under Heller I, “complete prohibition[s]” of Second Amendment rights are always
invalid. . . . We would flout this lesson of Heller I if we proceeded as if some benefits
could justify laws that necessarily destroy the ordinarily situated citizen’s right to bear
common arms—a right also guaranteed by the Amendment, on the most natural
reading of Heller I.
Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 665 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (alteration in original); see
also Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012) (striking down Illinois’s public carry
ban); Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1072 (9th Cir. 2018) (declaring Hawaii’s concealed carry
law unconstitutional in part because no concealed carry license had ever been granted).
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truly need it—those who have a “good cause.”4 Circuit courts split over
the constitutionality of these laws, how to analyze them, and the degree
to which Heller provides any guidance in determining their validity.5
Despite the underdeveloped status of the Second Amendment and the
circuit courts attacking one another’s methodologies and conclusions,
the Supreme Court had been reluctant to wade into these troubled
waters.6 But this changed with a new composition of the Court.
The only consensus in Second Amendment discourse is its lack of
clarity.7 Debates have raged over nearly every aspect of the protections
the Amendment affords, including who qualifies as a rights holder,
what garners protection, when individuals can demand access, and
where the rights can be exercised.8 With each open question—and the
list is quite lengthy—the entirety of the legal academy has searched
through historical records,9 various legal theories,10 empirical
4 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(2)(f) (McKinney 2021) (“A license for a pistol or
revolver, other than an assault weapon or a disguised gun, shall be issued to . . . have and carry
concealed, without regard to employment or place of possession, by any person when proper
cause exists for the issuance thereof.”).
5 See infra Section I.A.
6 See Rogers, 140 S. Ct. at 1865 (denying certiorari); see also Peruta v. California, 137 S. Ct.
1995, 1999 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“This discrepancy is inexcusable, especially given
how much less developed our jurisprudence is with respect to the Second Amendment as
compared to the First and Fourth Amendments.”).
7 See, e.g., Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Heller
provides no categorical answer to this case. And in many ways, it raises more questions than it
answers.”); Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 681 (“On the one hand, the
Heller Court recognized, for the first time, that the Second Amendment protected the
fundamental right of ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens’ to own firearms. On the other, it
recognized that this right was not ‘unlimited’ and observed that longstanding prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill are ‘presumptively lawful.’” (internal
citations omitted)); see also Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second
Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 378 (2009) (“The general consensus is that Heller
failed to provide a framework by which lower courts could judge the constitutionality of gun
control.”); Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of Columbia v.
Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1372 (2009) (“What theory, if any, can
explain the Court invalidating the District of Columbia handgun ban, while simultaneously
upholding the laws referenced in the exceptions?”).
8 See Michael R. Ulrich, A Public Health Law Path for Second Amendment Jurisprudence, 71
HASTINGS L.J. 1053, 1063–70 (2020) (describing the uncertainty and various debates among the
lower courts).
9 See, e.g., Larson, supra note 7, at 1374–78 (“One searches in vain through eighteenthcentury records . . . .”).
10 See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller,
122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 192 (2008) (explaining how Heller contains elements of both originalism
and living constitutionalism); Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as
Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246, 248 (2008) (describing Heller as “a narrow ruling with strong
minimalist features”); Blocher, supra note 7, at 404–13 (observing both categoricalism and
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methodologies,11 other established doctrines,12 and especially the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Heller for some clear rationale to address
the issue at hand.13 As the lower courts’ disarray suggests, the reliance
on these sources has been unhelpful in developing a cogent doctrine.
The contradictory logic and conclusions of Heller make it difficult to
use as guidance with any consistency.14 Meanwhile, a search through
history for consensus on the exact boundaries of the Second
Amendment right has been fraught with inconsistency.15 The result has
been constitutional clutter.
Second Amendment doctrine needs clarity, especially with respect
to public carry, and the Court’s probable focus on history is unlikely to
help—as the current chaos in the lower courts demonstrates. This
Article provides a straightforward and pragmatic path informed by
empirical data and public health law principles. Instead of searching
through historical documents to determine the boundaries of the
Second Amendment right, this Article accepts Heller’s proclamation
that the Constitution protects an individual right to keep and bear arms

balancing in Heller); Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 90 (2013) [hereinafter
Blocher, Firearm Localism] (“[F]irearm localism might address ongoing Second Amendment
debates . . . .”); Jacob D. Charles, Constructing a Constitutional Right: Borrowing and Second
Amendment Design Choices, 99 N.C. L. REV. 333, 337 (2021) (noting that Justice Scalia invited
constitutional borrowing by invoking First Amendment principles in Heller).
11 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the “More Guns, Less Crime”
Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1285–86 (2003); Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, More Guns,
Less Crime Fails Again: The Latest Evidence from 1977–2006, 6 ECON. J. WATCH 218 (2009); John
J. Donohue, Abhay Aneja & Kyle D. Weber, Right-to-Carry Laws and Violent Crime: A
Comprehensive Assessment Using Panel Data and a State-Level Synthetic Control Analysis, 16 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 198, 240 (2019) (using panel data and synthetic control estimates to
undermine the more guns, less crime hypothesis).
12 The First Amendment has been the most popular destination for guidance. See, e.g., Josh
Blackman, The 1st Amendment, 2nd Amendment, and 3D Printed Guns, 81 TENN. L. REV. 479
(2014); Joseph Blocher, Response, Second Things First: What Free Speech Can and Can’t Say
About Guns, 91 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 37 (2012); Joseph Blocher & Bardia Vaseghi, True Threats,
Self-Defense, and the Second Amendment, 48 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 112 (2020); David B. Kopel, The
First Amendment Guide to the Second Amendment, 81 TENN. L. REV. 417 (2014); Gregory P.
Magarian, Speaking Truth to Firepower: How the First Amendment Destabilizes the Second, 91
TEX. L. REV. 49 (2012); Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second
Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278 (2009); Jordan E. Pratt, A First Amendment-Inspired
Approach to Heller’s “Schools” and “Government Buildings,” 92 NEB. L. REV. 537 (2014); Eugene
Volokh, The First and Second Amendments, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 97 (2009). But it is
certainly not the only doctrine that has been looked to for guidance. See, e.g., Darrell A.H. Miller,
Text, History, and Tradition: What the Seventh Amendment Can Teach Us About the Second, 122
YALE L.J. 852 (2013).
13 See infra Section I.A.
14 See David T. Hardy, The Right to Arms and Standards of Review: A Tale of Three Circuits,
46 CONN. L. REV. 1435, 1447–53 (2014).
15 See infra Section I.A.
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and presumes, as a starting point, that the right is quite broad. As a
result, rather than fight over the elusive scope of the right, the analysis
then shifts to the state’s interest in limiting that right in light of a
growing gun violence epidemic.16 Courts should not view Second
Amendment struggles through a lens of individual rights versus an
oppressive government.17 A more precise interpretation is a conflict of
rights between those who wish to carry firearms and those who ask their
elected officials to protect their freedoms and liberties by reducing the
threat of gun violence in shared public spaces.18
This framing is particularly important because it diminishes the
significance of history and the scope of the right, which is essential to a
“rights-as-trumps” approach to the Second Amendment. At its
simplest, the rights-as-trumps view is that the existence of a right limits
the ability of the government to justify limiting that right.19 As Ronald
Dworkin—most commonly associated with this framework—argued, to
subject a right to limitations based on the common good is to deny the
right’s existence altogether.20 This conceptualization would be
particularly useful to those arguing for a strong right to public carry.
But, as Professor Jamal Greene states, it ignores the fact that “[o]ur
rights culture cannot constitute us unless all rights count, and all rights
cannot count if all rights are absolute.”21 As Professor Greene accurately
puts it, “Because the rights-as-trumps frame cannot accommodate
conflicts of rights, it forces us to deny that our opponents have them.”22
A public health–informed perspective provides a potential path
forward.23 Public health is about finding a balance between risks and

16

Then-Judge Amy Coney Barrett argued for this approach in her Kanter v. Barr dissent:

In other contexts that involve the loss of a right, the deprivation occurs because of state
action, and state action determines the scope of the loss . . . . So too with the right to
keep and bear arms: a state can disarm certain people (for example, those convicted of
crimes of domestic violence), but if it refrains from doing so, their rights remain
constitutionally protected.
919 F.3d 437, 452–53 (7th Cir. 2019). In Justice Barrett’s reading, “[T]he ‘scope of the right’
approach is at odds with Heller itself.” Id. at 453.
17 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008) (discussing the connection
between the right to keep and bear arms and a concern over an oppressive government).
18 Reva B. Siegel & Joseph Blocher, Why Regulate Guns?, 48 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 11, 12 (2020)
(describing the connection between protecting people from gun violence and their ability to
exercise other freedoms and rights); see also Ulrich, supra note 8, at 1073 (connecting health with
the ability to enjoy other rights).
19 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 191 (1977).
20 Id. at 192.
21 Jamal Greene, Foreword: Rights as Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28, 34 (2018).
22 Id.
23 See Ulrich, supra note 8, at 1057.
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rights.24 A population-based perspective informed by empirical
research shapes a more informed analysis, one that acknowledges the
limitations of personal responsibility in protecting and promoting one’s
well-being. This lens benefits from limiting the power of constitutional
rhetoric detached from real-world complexity and incorporating
essential public health tenets such as social determinants. The
constitutional question then is whether a state is authorized to take
proactive measures—such as limiting, but not eliminating, firearms in
public—or whether they must rely on reactive criminal enforcement to
address gun violence.25
This Article argues for the importance of a population-based
analysis informed by empirics in three Parts. Part I examines the
current disagreements among lower courts regarding the right to carry.
It then highlights the manner in which a reliance on history contributes
to the uncertainty and stalled development of Second Amendment
jurisprudence. Part II reframes the analysis by placing the Second
Amendment in a contemporary context. It utilizes a population-based
view to highlight the tension between gun owners’ rights to carry in
public and the impact a proliferation of firearms in community settings
can have on the larger populace. Finally, Part III investigates the claims
on each side of the equation. Rather than rely on the problematic
tendency of courts to employ a rights-as-trumps approach, which
obscures the reality of this country’s gun violence problem, public
health reminds us that all people are rights-bearers. Using empirics to
investigate the true burden of a public carry restriction, this Part
concludes that the individual burden is likely outweighed by the
government’s compelling interest in protecting the public, justifying at
least some public carry restrictions. In doing so, this Article presents a
balanced approach that looks not merely for the scope of the right but
investigates the justification the state has for limiting that right to
protect the broader public.
I. THE PUBLIC CARRY PROBLEM
Though the D.C. law challenged in Heller did prohibit carrying
handguns in public, the Court limited its examination to the regulation
of handguns in the home. But in attempting to define the contours of

24 WENDY K. MARINER, GEORGE J. ANNAS, NICOLE HUBERFELD & MICHAEL R. ULRICH,
PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 3 (3d ed. 2019) (“Public health is all about finding a balance between risks
and rights—how to identify, characterize, classify, quantify, prevent, or least control risks to the
public without negatively affecting human rights.”).
25 See infra Part III.
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an individual Second Amendment right, the Heller majority wrote that
the right to carry a firearm was grounded not simply in self-defense, but
“for a particular purpose—confrontation.”26 Confrontations can occur
anywhere and certainly outside of the home.27 Yet, the Court left the
question of whether, or to what degree, the right of self-defense extends
beyond the home for lower courts to decide.28 Unanimity was unlikely
and, as expected, was not the result. As the next Section will
demonstrate, the only consensus that emerged from the circuit courts
in determining the right to carry firearms in public is that Heller
provides little in terms of definitive guidance.29 And lower courts’
efforts to find guidance from the annals of history has proven similarly
unhelpful.30
A.

Lower Court Chaos

The manner in which states handle carrying firearms in public
essentially falls into three categories: permitless carry, shall-issue, and
may-issue.31 The least restrictive is permitless carry because an
26 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 584 (2008). The majority actually used
language from a prior Justice Ginsburg opinion to further support this holding: “[s]urely a most
familiar meaning is, as the Constitution’s Second Amendment . . . indicate[s]: ‘wear, bear, or
carry . . . upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose . . . of being armed
and ready for offensive or defensive action in case of conflict with another person.’” Id.
(alterations in original) (quoting Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 143 (1998) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting)).
27 Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Confrontations are not limited to
the home.”).
28 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (“[S]ince this case represents this Court’s first in-depth examination
of the Second Amendment, one should not expect it to clarify the entire field . . . .”).
29 Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2012). The word “definitive”
is important. The Heller opinion has been criticized for the ambiguous and often contradictory
statements made within it. Stacey L. Sobel, The Tsunami of Legal Uncertainty: What’s a Court to
Do Post-McDonald, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 489, 499–507 (2012). While one particular
aspect of the opinion might provide guidance in one direction or another with regard to gun
rights in the public sphere, there is inevitably another point in the opinion that could be
construed as suggesting just the opposite. See Larson, supra note 7, at 1386 (explaining that the
originalist analysis the Court uses at times cannot be used to explain the presumptively lawful
exceptions listed in the same opinion).
30 See infra Section I.A.
31 Michael Siegel et al., Easiness of Legal Access to Concealed Firearm Permits and Homicide
Rates in the United States, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1923, 1923 (2017). Giffords Law Center
categorizes the laws in four groups, distinguishing between shall-issue states with no discretion
and shall-issue states with limited discretion. Guns in Public: Concealed Carry, GIFFORDS L. CTR.
TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, https://giffords.org/lawcenter/gun-laws/policy-areas/guns-inpublic/concealed-carry/#state [https://perma.cc/6VXB-EV7K]. This distinction is ultimately less
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individual does not need a permit to carry a firearm in public.32 Instead,
the primary restriction comes from determining who is able to legally
own a firearm.33 However, there may be restrictions such as limiting
permitless carry to state residents or prohibiting carry in certain
spaces.34
A slightly more restrictive public carry regime is a shall-issue law.
Under shall-issue statutes, a license is required to carry a firearm in
public.35 However, the licensing authority has no discretion in
providing these licenses.36 The law lays out the criteria for who is
eligible, and as long as an individual qualifies, the state must grant them
a license for public carry.37 The requirements vary by state but may
include minimum age, residency, background checks, safety training,
and payment of fees. How restrictive the shall-issue law is varies based
on state requirements, where a state might mandate all of the
requirements listed above or none of them.
Because these two prior categories are considered permissive, their
constitutionality is not the focus of those who wish to carry their
firearms in public more easily. Gun rights advocates consider the mayissue permitting scheme unconstitutionally restrictive because it grants
discretion to those who issue carry permits—typically members of law
enforcement—to determine whether an individual warrants a permit.38
Again, the exact mechanics of this type of public carry regime vary by
state. Some may-issue regulations have installed appeal processes and
require the state to provide reasons for denial. Other states have neither.
Still, other may-issue states act essentially as shall-issue states by
removing the discretion in practice.39

relevant for purposes of this Article, where the focus is on requirements above a general desire
for self-defense.
32 See Guns in Public: Concealed Carry, supra note 31.
33 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3102 (2010).
34 Some states may allow firearms to be carried in public without a permit but restrict their
ability to be used by mandating they be unloaded and in a container, for example. Given that this
Article is focused on the constitutionality of public carry with regard to weighing the right to selfdefense against the potential risk to the public, states allowing public carry but not in a manner
in which it is ready for use in self-defense are not considered permitless states.
35 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-75(a)(1)a (2019).
36 See, e.g., id.
37 For example, the Alabama statute specifies factors the sheriff may consider, but they all
relate to mental health. Id.
38 Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 86–87 (2d Cir. 2012).
39 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-47-2-3(f) (2019). While the statute requires “a proper reason” for
an individual to be eligible to carry a firearm, a desire to carry a gun for self-defense qualifies and
cannot be evaluated by the licensing individual or body. Schubert v. DeBard, 398 N.E.2d 1339,
1341 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
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Though the focus of this Article is on public carry generally, it also
addresses a specific type of may-issue permitting known as good cause
or proper cause regulations. These laws are of particular interest most
obviously because they are at the heart of New York State Rifle & Pistol
Ass’n v. Bruen, the most important Supreme Court Second Amendment
case since Heller.40 But more generally, these laws are critical to examine
because they highlight the essential question in every gun-related
regulation: how to balance protecting the public and individual rights.
These restrictions require individuals who wish to carry a firearm in
public to show why they need the permit, which typically must be a need
above a general desire for self-defense that distinguishes them from the
general public.41 And it is the fact that the general desire for self-defense
does not qualify that has brought into focus the constitutional tension
between individual rights and state authority to restrict public carry for
the good of the community.
These good cause regulations have been upheld and struck down
by circuit courts, with a variety of justifications and analytical tools
used. The lack of consensus, not only in terms of outcome but how to
approach the question, demonstrates the vast ambiguity left by Heller.
The courts could not agree on what Heller says about the core of the
Second Amendment and its scope of protections outside the home.
They could not agree on the standard of review or how history should
factor into constitutional analysis of proper cause restrictions. The
courts could not even agree on what category this type of law should fall
into, with some judges evaluating the restrictions as a complete ban
despite the fact that the regulation does not actually ban all individuals
from carrying firearms in public. And, most importantly for this
Article, the degree to which these decisions discuss gun violence, if at
all, varies greatly.
In Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, one of the first cases to
address one of these restrictions, the Second Circuit upheld New York’s
handgun-licensing plan that required applicants to show proper cause
to obtain a license to carry a concealed firearm in public.42 It is
important to note that New York prohibited open carry completely as
well, though Kachalsky focused strictly on the right to carry a concealed
weapon in public.43 As discussed below, some courts address both
methods of carry—concealed and open—in tandem, stressing that the
critical constitutional question is to what degree the Second
40 N.Y. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Beach, 818 F. App’x 99 (2d Cir. 2020) (mem.), cert. granted
sub nom., N.Y. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Corlett, 141 S. Ct. 2566 (2021).
41 Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 86.
42 Id. at 84.
43 Id. at 86.
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Amendment right extends beyond the home.44 Other courts, such as the
Second Circuit in Kachalsky, simply looked at what the challenged law
specifically regulated. This Article focuses on the broader category of
public carry because, while each may have unique impacts on public
health and safety, both place the public at risk.45
Since 1913, individuals in New York who wish to carry a concealed
firearm in public must show proper cause, which over time courts have
held is “a special need for self-protection distinguishable from that of
the general community or of persons engaged in the same profession,”
as determined by a licensing officer (often local judges).46 Though the
statute did not define “proper cause,” state courts determined that
“[g]ood moral character plus a simple desire to carry a weapon [was]
not enough. Nor [was] living or being employed in a ‘high crime
area.’”47 The Second Circuit found no guidance from Heller in
determining the constitutionality of the “proper cause” regulation.48
The court rejected the notion that it must rely solely on text, history,
and tradition to determine constitutionality; but, more importantly, the
court found that even if it believed this were the proper approach, the
historical record is ambiguous because there is no apparent consensus
with regard to good cause restrictions.49 The court even went so far as
to question the validity of relying on historical analogues to determine
the constitutionality of modern statutes: “Analogizing New York’s
licensing scheme (or any other gun regulation for that matter) to the
array of statutes enacted or construed over one hundred years ago has
its limits.”50
Instead, the court opted for a more traditional form of
constitutional analysis, utilizing heightened scrutiny because the
regulation places “substantial limits on the ability of law-abiding
citizens to possess firearms for self-defense in public.”51 However, the
Second Circuit’s interpretation of Heller and McDonald is that “Second
Amendment guarantees are at their zenith within the home.”52 As a
E.g., Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 663 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
For example, concealed carry makes it more difficult for people who wish to minimize
their presence near firearms to take proactive steps to do so. Meanwhile, open carry has the
potential to cause stress, anxiety, and other mental duress for those intimidated and fearful of
guns as well as those who have had prior traumatic exposure to them.
46 Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 86–87.
47 Id. at 87 (internal citations omitted).
48 Id. at 88 (“Heller provides no categorical answer to this case.”).
49 Id. at 91. The court found nothing in the record that directly addressed the
constitutionality of proper cause restrictions. Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 93.
52 Id. at 89.
44
45
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result, it did not believe strict scrutiny was the applicable standard here
and instead applied intermediate scrutiny.53 The court ultimately
determined the state’s decision to limit public carry to those with proper
cause was substantially related to the state’s interest in protecting public
safety.54
But while public safety is mentioned as the state’s interest, the
Second Circuit’s primary analysis still revolved around historical
digging and its interpretation of Heller. In fact, while the court rejected
the notion that analyzing history is the applicable analytical standard,
most of the opinion is spent looking to the past.55 The court actually
spent no time on the state’s interest in protecting the public and the
current threat of gun violence. They simply accepted the state’s interest
in public safety and crime prevention as compelling and moved on.56
And, perhaps surprisingly, the court again went back to the historical
record to find the state’s justification. The court discussed the legislative
record for the statute and emphasized the importance of judicial
deference to legislative assessments of conflicting evidence for public
policy choices.57 But, while the original legislative record and deference
to legislative judgment may be relevant, the analysis of such a hotly
debated constitutional question would seem to warrant more than what
policymakers thought over a century ago.
In Woollard v. Gallagher, the Fourth Circuit agreed with much of
the Second Circuit’s reasoning.58 When looking to Heller, the Fourth
Circuit also found carrying firearms in public to be outside core Second
53 Id. at 93. The court cited to cases from the First, Third, Fourth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits
in reaching this conclusion, though none of the cases it mentioned are for public carry. See id at
93 n.17. The court also made a point to note that infringing on an enumerated right does not
always trigger strict scrutiny, using the regulation of commercial speech as an example. Id. at 93–
94 (“It is also consistent with jurisprudential experience analyzing other enumerated rights. For
instance, when analyzing First Amendment claims . . . laws regulating commercial speech are
subject to intermediate scrutiny.”). For more on this common misconception, see Adam Winkler,
Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamental Rights, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 227, 233 (2006). For
more on how this applies in cases involving public health and safety, as public carry certainly
does, see Ulrich, supra note 8, at 1079–84.
54 Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 98.
55 Compare id. at 89 n.9, with id. at 89–91. The court looks back to history again to justify the
use of intermediate scrutiny by discussing historical evidence of states regulating firearms in
public. Id. at 94–96 (“Because our tradition so clearly indicates a substantial role for state
regulation of the carrying of firearms in public, we conclude that intermediate scrutiny is
appropriate in this case.”).
56 Id. at 97 (“As the parties agree, New York has substantial, indeed compelling,
governmental interests in public safety and crime prevention. The only question then is whether
the proper cause requirement is substantially related to these interests.” (internal citations
omitted)).
57 Id. at 97–98.
58 See Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013).
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Amendment protections.59 And citing Kachalsky, it held that historical
research supported the notion that firearm rights have been more
limited outside of the home due to concerns of public safety.60
Therefore, it also applied intermediate scrutiny.61
The Fourth Circuit, however, did provide slightly more detail
about the state’s interest, and the connection between the good cause
restriction at issue and that government interest. Relying on legislative
findings, the court focused primarily on reducing harm caused by
criminals.62 While this is no doubt important, it obscures the broader
risk of harm presented by a potential proliferation of firearms in
public.63 The court did mention one other state interest that is
particularly relevant: “[A]dditional regulations on the wearing,
carrying, and transporting of handguns are necessary to preserve the
peace and tranquility of the State and to protect the rights and liberties
of the public.”64
Here, the court properly framed the tension as not simply one of
individual rights versus government regulation, and not simply about
individual self-defense versus public safety. Rather, this stated interest
makes clear that limiting gun violence is a means of defending other
constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the public.65
Unfortunately, the Fourth Circuit did not analyze or discuss this
interest in any detail and did not return to it during the second step of
the intermediate scrutiny analysis. Instead, the court concluded that the
good cause restriction advanced the state’s objectives, largely by
decreasing the number of handguns carried in public.66
Each of these cases upheld the power of the state to limit carrying
firearms in public to those who can demonstrate a specific need to do
so, but the cases did so by primarily looking back in time. Each spent
the bulk of its analysis examining historical records of what the Second

Id. at 874.
Id. at 876.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 876–77.
63 See infra Section III.A.
64 Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876–77 (emphasis added).
65 See infra Section II.B.
66 Woollard, 712 F.3d at 879–80. Specifically, the court listed that reducing the number of
handguns in public decreases availability of handgun theft by criminals, lessens the likelihood of
basic confrontations turning deadly, averts consequences that can result from a third party
during a confrontation between officer and criminal, reduces handguns during routine
encounters between police and citizens, minimizes the number of handgun sightings that must
be investigated, and facilitates the identification of individuals carrying handguns who pose a
threat. Id.
59
60
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Amendment protects to support its interpretation that Heller finds the
core of the right to be within the home.
The Third Circuit, by contrast, came to the same conclusion in
Drake v. Filko, but eschewed a historical examination and refused to
determine whether and to what degree the Second Amendment
protections extend into the public sphere.67 Even if Second Amendment
protections do extend beyond the home, the Third Circuit argued that
Heller’s references to presumptively lawful, long-standing prohibitions
established that there are exceptions to the right.68 Here we have yet
another variation of a Heller interpretation. The Third Circuit
interpreted the Supreme Court’s declaration that long-standing
prohibitions are presumptively lawful to mean limitations that are longstanding are exceptions to the right and are not within the scope of the
Second Amendment.69
In Heller, one of the long-standing prohibitions listed is the
prohibition of possession of firearms by felons.70 However, the Supreme
Court noted the list of long-standing prohibitions was not exhaustive.
The Third Circuit identified that New York’s proper cause restriction
was adopted in the same era as the felon-in-possession laws identified
in Heller.71 Since New Jersey’s regulation is substantially similar to New
York’s—and was adopted only eleven years later—the Third Circuit
considered this a long-standing prohibition.72 Consequently, the Third
Circuit determined that a justifiable need requirement—the language
used in the New Jersey statute—for carrying in public did not burden
conduct within the scope of the Second Amendment’s protections

67 See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 429–31 (3d Cir. 2013). Still, the court agreed with the
assessment in Kachalsky that the historical record does not speak with one voice. Id. at 431.
68 Id. at 431–32. The portion of the Heller opinion the Third Circuit relied on reads:

Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope
of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,
or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the
commercial sale of arms.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008). Then in a footnote, the court clarified
that “[w]e identify these presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as examples; our list does
not purport to be exhaustive.” Id. at 627 n.26.
69 Drake, 724 F.3d at 432.
70 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
71 Drake, 724 F.3d at 433.
72 Id. at 432–34.
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regardless of whether it was open or concealed carry.73 This provides yet
another method for interpreting Heller in evaluating public carry
restrictions.
The Ninth Circuit’s handling of good cause restrictions is
particularly interesting given the tension among its own judges. After
initially striking down a good cause requirement, an en banc panel
reversed the decision in Peruta v. County of San Diego.74 Rather than
use a standard of review as the Second and Fourth Circuits did, the
Ninth Circuit held that “the Second Amendment does not preserve or
protect a right of a member of the general public to carry concealed
firearms in public.”75 While the conclusion is similar to that of the Third
Circuit, the path to that conclusion was, yet again, quite different.
The Ninth Circuit found direct support from Heller and its longstanding prohibitions, where the Supreme Court noted that the Second
Amendment had not been understood to protect the right to concealed
carry.76 And given Heller’s reliance on a historical review, the Ninth
Circuit went through the historical record and determined there was no
evidence to suggest the Second Amendment protected a right to
concealed carry at all.77 Thus, any limitation on concealed carry was
inherently constitutional.78 Importantly, the court refused to consider
the restriction on concealed carry in conjunction with the complete
prohibition on open carry.79 Instead, it made clear that if there is a right
to public carry, it is only a right to do so openly.80
The narrow focus of Peruta on concealed carry led to Young v.
Hawaii, where the Ninth Circuit initially declared a constitutionally
73 Id. at 429; see also id. at 433 (“[T]he ‘justifiable need’ standard . . . in New Jersey must be
met to carry openly or concealed . . . .”). The Third Circuit went on to say that the restriction
would survive intermediate scrutiny analysis, though it came to this conclusion with no data or
evidence to support the connection between the state interest and the regulation. Id. at 437–40.
Instead, the court presumed there is a substantial connection and emphasized the importance of
deferring to legislative judgment. Id.
74 Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 939 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). An individual
requesting a license for concealed carry had to demonstrate “a set of circumstances that
distinguish the applicant from the mainstream and causes him or her to be placed in harm’s way.”
Id. at 926. A simple fear for one’s safety would not suffice. Id.
75 Id. at 924.
76 Id. at 928. The Ninth Circuit pointed out that later in the Heller opinion the Court made
clear that, despite striking down the D.C. law, the District was left with a variety of tools, and the
Ninth Circuit referred the reader back to the portion of the opinion that states: “For example, the
majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying
concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues.” Id.
77 Id. at 929.
78 For concealed carry, “any prohibition or restriction a state may choose to impose . . . is
necessarily allowed.” Id. at 939.
79 Id. at 941–42.
80 See id. (“If there is such a right, it is only a right to carry a firearm openly.”).
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protected right to open carry.81 Looking to text, history, and Heller, the
panel in Young found that the Second Amendment’s protections must
extend beyond the home.82 Given that Peruta closed off the possibility
that the Second Amendment protects concealed carry, the protection
must be for open carry.83 Central to the Young panel’s holding was the
fact that to keep and bear arms must be equally protected, and if the
Second Amendment codifies self-defense in matters of confrontation,
such a threat is not confined to one’s dwelling.84
With this holding established, dismissing the good cause
restriction was simple because the record demonstrated that no cause
had ever met the standard and resulted in a public carry license being
issued by the State of Hawaii.85 While the panel in Young spent most of
its opinion on the historical record, the constitutional analysis was brief.
The panel saw the good cause restriction as essentially a ban because
this was indeed how it had operated.86
But Young was reheard en banc, and this time the Ninth Circuit
sided with the State.87 Again, though, we see an opinion steeped in
historical analysis, where the court analyzed an array of restrictions on
the right to carry firearms in public.88 According to the en banc panel,
the good cause restriction is consistent with those restrictions found in
English and American legal history.89 Consequently, the court held the
good cause restriction was “within the state’s legitimate police powers”
and did not impact a right within the scope of the Second
Amendment.90 Thus, Young joins Peruta in demonstrating the
difficulty—if not impossibility—of finding an objective consensus in
what history tells us about the Second Amendment, its scope of
protections, or how to interpret the laws from generations prior.
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, however, saw the good
cause regulation in much the same way the initial Young panel did: as a
ban for law-abiding citizens. The D.C. Circuit struck down a “good
cause” law in Wrenn v. District of Columbia, disagreeing strongly with

81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1074 (9th Cir. 2018).
Id.
Id. at 1068.
Id. at 1070.
Id.
Id. at 1071.
See Young v. Hawaii, 992 F.3d 765, 773 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc).
Id. at 784–826.
Id. at 826.
Id.
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the Second Circuit’s prior analysis.91 The court explicitly rejected the
Second Circuit’s “hasty inference[s]” in Kachalsky that rights merit less
protection outside the home, finding instead that the government is
obligated to leave alternative channels for an individual to protect
themselves in public spaces.92 The D.C. Circuit looked to Heller to
determine the scope of the Second Amendment’s core protections,
focusing on the protection of “individual self-defense” by “law-abiding,
responsible citizens.”93 The D.C. Circuit found the Heller language
about the need being most acute in the home to be no limit on the core,
because the underlying value of the Second Amendment right is selfdefense, and “the need for that might arise beyond as well as within the
home.”94 As the Ninth Circuit ruled in Young, the D.C. Circuit also
believed that excluding public carry from the core did not treat each
aspect of the amendment—to keep and bear arms—equally.95
Given the finding that public carry was a core right, the Wrenn
court determined that the D.C. law amounted essentially to a ban for
most law-abiding citizens.96 The D.C. Circuit read Heller as requiring a
categorical approach to bans, removing its ability to proceed “as if some
benefits could justify laws that necessarily destroy the ordinarily

91 Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017). To carry a concealed weapon
in the District, an individual was required to show “‘good reason to fear injury to [their] person
or property’ or ‘any other proper reason for carrying a pistol.’” Id. at 655 (alteration in original)
(quoting D.C. CODE § 22-4506 (2015), invalidated by Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d
650 (D.C. Cir. 2017)). The law required “evidence of specific threats or previous attacks that
demonstrate a special danger.” Id. (quoting D.C. CODE § 7-2509.11 (2015), invalidated by Wrenn
v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017)). Similar to the New York law upheld in
Kachalsky, “living or working ‘in a high crime area shall not by itself establish a good reason’ to
carry.” Id. at 656 (quoting D.C. MUN. REGULS. tit. 24, § 2333.4 (2015), invalidated by Grace v.
District of Columbia, 187 F. Supp. 3d 124 (D.C. Cir. 2016)). The applicant must show a “special
need for self-protection distinguishable from the general community.” Id. at 655 (quoting D.C.
CODE § 7-2509.11 (2015), invalidated by Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir.
2017)).
92 Id. at 662. In the opinion of the D.C. Circuit, this analogy to speech-rights doctrine helps
to explain the Heller acceptance of carry restrictions in sensitive places since individuals would
be free to carry in most other settings and avoid those with restrictions. Id.
93 Id. at 657.
94 Id. Looking to Heller, “in the Court’s own words, the ‘right to possess and carry weapons
in case of confrontation,’” requires such a reading. Id. at 658 (quoting District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)). However, others have questioned whether self-defense can truly be
the sole or even core value of the right as interpreted in Heller. See Blocher, supra note 7, at 413
(“[I]t is difficult to discern the principles or values behind Heller’s carve-outs.”). “Heller’s
categoricalism neither reflects nor enables a clear view of the Second Amendment’s core values—
whatever they may be—and . . . Heller therefore fails to justify the constitutional categories it
creates.” Id. at 377–78.
95 Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 662.
96 Id. at 666.
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situated citizen’s right to bear common arms.”97 This makes it apparent
that, according to the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of the Second
Amendment, what matters is the individual right and not the rights of
others. The court’s categorical methodology is a narrow, individualistic
approach that ignores both the fact that the regulation is meant to limit
firearms in public, not completely ban them, and limit the potential risk
to public safety that stems from its approach to constitutional analysis.98
The First Circuit then took aim at the historical interpretation
found in Wrenn, starting another fight over history. Reviewing another
“good cause” restriction in Gould v. Morgan, the First Circuit said that
Wrenn relied too heavily on historical information derived from the
antebellum South, which it did not believe reflected a national
consensus.99 The First Circuit did not find public carry to be a part of
the Second Amendment’s core protections, in part because—similarly
to the Second Circuit—it held that constitutional rights receive less
protection outside the home.100 But in considering the issue of selfdefense specifically, the First Circuit also factored in that outside of the
home, “society typically relies on police officers, security guards, and
the watchful eyes of concerned citizens to mitigate threats.”101
The First Circuit found no support in history and no guidance
from Heller and, therefore, applied intermediate scrutiny to the good
cause restrictions, recognizing that “few interests are more central to a
state government than protecting the safety and well-being of its
97 Id. at 665. “And under Heller I, ‘complete prohibition[s]’ of Second Amendment rights are
always invalid.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 629).
98 For the court to determine that the restriction constitutes a ban, it must avoid looking at
the statute from a population perspective. Instead, it narrows the focus to the challengers alone.
But in doing so, it disregards the state interest for passing the legislation in the first place. It is
not to ban these individuals, but to limit the firearms in public to those who truly need it, in an
effort to reduce the risk of gun violence in the public sphere. This narrow categorical approach
to the rights and interests at stake enables a form of judicial activism. As Professor Joseph Blocher
puts it:

Far from limiting judicial power, categorical opinions like Heller tend to increase it by
giving judges the extraordinary responsibility of striking down popularly enacted
legislation. While limiting judicial discretion is the very purpose of categoricalism, it
inevitably increases the power of those who establish the categories in the first place.
And since it is usually higher courts—particularly the Supreme Court—that create
categorical rules, categoricalism does not reduce the power wielded by the judiciary as
a whole but simply takes it away from trial judges weighing interests in individual cases
and gives it to appellate judges.
Blocher, supra note 7, at 437.
99 Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 669 (1st Cir. 2018). Unlike Wrenn, which “relied primarily
on historical data derived from the antebellum South,” the First Circuit found “no national
consensus, rooted in history, concerning the right to public carriage of firearms.” Id.
100 Id. at 671.
101 Id.
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citizens.”102 Referencing more data than the prior cases had, the First
Circuit acknowledged that there was evidence that the restriction was
effective in advancing the state’s interest in safety, but that this evidence
was still open to debate.103 But, in the court’s view, the question was not
one of definitive efficacy: “It would be foolhardy—and wrong—to
demand that the legislature support its policy choices with an
impregnable wall of unanimous empirical studies. Instead, the court’s
duty is simply ‘to assure that, in formulating its judgments, [the
legislature] has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial
evidence.’”104 According to the First Circuit, the state had made a
reasonable choice by providing “a substantial link between the
restrictions imposed on the public carriage of firearms and the
indisputable governmental interests in public safety and crime
prevention.”105
What we see in the cases above are courts that cannot agree on the
historical record, the meaning of Heller, the core of the Second
Amendment, or the standard of review. Courts that reach the same
conclusion do so with different interpretations of critical aspects of the
analysis. Those using similar methods come to drastically different
conclusions.
Contrary to any claims of objective guidance that history and
tradition provide, these cases make it apparent that relying on historical
examination is quite fraught. Even the courts who believe history is not
dispositive on the outcome of the cases spend much of their opinions
mired in historical research methodology and justifying their own
analyses and interpretations of documents from centuries ago.106 Both
proponents of gun control and gun rights are unhappy with the
uncertainty and inconsistency currently plaguing the Second
Amendment doctrine. While some may describe a historical analysis as
more objective,107 the truth is that the indeterminate direction of Second
Amendment jurisprudence is more likely a feature than a bug of a

102 Id. at 673. “Heller simply does not provide a categorical answer” to the issue of public carry,
and “nothing in Heller ‘impugn[s] legislative designs that comprise . . . public welfare regulations
aimed at addressing perceived inherent dangers and risks surrounding the public possession of
loaded, operable firearms.’” Id. at 668 (alterations in original) (quoting Powell v. Tompkins, 783
F.3d 332, 346 (1st Cir. 2015)).
103 Id. at 675–76.
104 Id. at 676 (alteration in original) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,
666 (1994)).
105 Id. at 674.
106 See supra notes 49–57 and accompanying text.
107 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 804 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(describing a historical test as “less subjective because it depends upon a body of evidence
susceptible of reasoned analysis”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3810404

2022]

SECOND AMENDMENT REALISM

1397

reliance on history. And, perhaps more importantly, as seen in other
areas of jurisprudence, the centrality of history in Second Amendment
interpretation is far from essential.
B.

Trapped in History108

Ambiguity around the constitutionality of gun regulations can lead
to inaction and rancor between policymakers and the public.109 The
Supreme Court will likely clarify at least some aspects of the Second
Amendment right in its upcoming decision in Bruen, and it is already
apparent that history will play a central role. During the Bruen oral
argument, history was discussed at great length by the Justices and
attorneys for each party. And the focus on history by the advocates
should come as no surprise, as a significant number of the Supreme
Court Justices had made it clear that they believe the policy options
available to address the gun violence we are witnessing today are
constrained by history.
Some Justices have been quite explicit in their belief that not only
does history have a role to play in Second Amendment jurisprudence,
but that history is the only method to determine the constitutionality of
laws implicating Second Amendment rights. Justice Thomas has been
perhaps the most vocal that the Supreme Court take another Second
Amendment case to alleviate lower courts’ “defiance” of what he
believes was a declaration from Heller and McDonald to focus on
history, writing several dissents from the Court’s denials of certiorari.110
He has been particularly troubled by the use of intermediate scrutiny
and, in an opinion joined by Justice Gorsuch, has maintained that
courts must look to the “relevant history . . . . [including] sources from
England, the founding era, the antebellum period, and
Reconstruction.”111 Ignoring the vast array of cases using the tiers of
scrutiny to evaluate constitutional rights, Justice Thomas believes the
Second Amendment has been “singled out for special—and specially

108 “Joyce is right about history being a nightmare—but it may be the nightmare from which
no one can awaken. People are trapped in history and history is trapped in them.” JAMES
BALDWIN, Stranger in the Village, in NOTES OF A NATIVE SON 163, 166–67 (1955).
109 See Greene, supra note 21, at 84.
110 See, e.g., Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 951 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Our
continued refusal to hear Second Amendment cases only enables this kind of defiance.”), denying
cert. sub nom. to Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 2016).
111 Peruta v. California, 137 S. Ct. 1995, 1998 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting), denying cert. sub
nom. to Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016). In Silvester, Justice Thomas
expressed his support for judges who have used a historical analysis. Silvester, 138 S. Ct. at 947
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
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unfavorable—treatment,” labeling the right the Supreme Court’s
“constitutional orphan.”112
Before a shift in the Court’s personnel, a petition for certiorari to
consider New Jersey’s “justified need” requirement for public carry—
which the Third Circuit upheld in Woollard, discussed above—was
denied.113 In dissent, Justice Thomas stated definitively that “text,
history, and tradition are dispositive in determining whether a
challenged law violates the right to keep and bear arms,” as required by
the Court’s decision in Heller.114 According to Thomas, “States can
impose restrictions on an individual’s right to bear arms that are
consistent with historical limitations.”115 Thus, the analysis begins and
ends with historical analogues.
Justice Kavanaugh joined this part of the dissent, which is no
surprise considering he wrote largely the same thing as a judge on the
D.C. Circuit. In the D.C. Circuit’s follow-up case to Heller, then-Judge
Kavanaugh wrote a dissent not simply because he came to a different
conclusion but also because he disagreed with the use of intermediate
scrutiny.116 Instead, he argued that “the proper test to apply is Heller’s
history- and tradition-based test” and not any tiers-of-scrutiny review
standards.117 Justice Kavanaugh made his stance clear again when he
agreed with another dissent from Justice Alito—in a per curiam opinion
declaring that the first Second Amendment case taken up since
McDonald was moot—that also endorsed a review standard that must
look to “laws in force around the time of the adoption of the Second
Amendment.”118 During the Bruen oral argument, Justice Kavanaugh
again reiterated his concern about courts using any review method
other than text, history, and tradition.119

Silvester, 138 S. Ct. at 952.
Rogers v. Grewal, 140 S. Ct. 1865, 1865 (2020), denying cert. to No. 18-2366, 2018 WL
10808705 (3d Cir. Sept. 21, 2018) (mem.).
114 Id. at 1866 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
115 Id. at 1874.
116 Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting).
117 Id. at 1295.
118 N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1526–27, 1541
(2020) (Alito, J., dissenting).
119 Transcript of Oral Argument at 53, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct.
333 (2021) (No. 20-843), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/
2021/20-843_f2q3.pdf [https://perma.cc/ADX2-R6K7]. Justice Kavanaugh again equated all
tiers-of-scrutiny review standards as “balancing tests,” which he believes would “make it a policy
judgment basically for the courts.” Id. Justice Kavanaugh did not explain whether his negative
view of the tiers of scrutiny extends beyond the Second Amendment, but at the same time he
does appear to indicate jurisprudence of other rights is worthy of consideration. Id. at 116.
112
113
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Another history-centric opinion as a lower court judge came from
Justice Barrett. In Kanter v. Barr, then-Judge Barrett dissented from a
ruling upholding a prohibition for felons from possessing firearms.120 A
substantial majority of Justice Barrett’s dissent focused on a historical
excavation to determine whether the legislature was able to strip the
Second Amendment right of nonviolent felons.121 This is because, in
Justice Barrett’s opinion, the options left to the legislature are limited to
those policies that can be traced as “lineal descendants” of historical
laws.122 Justice Barrett did question, during the Bruen argument,
whether there would always be historical analogs to use.123
While Chief Justice Roberts has not specifically written an opinion
emphasizing the role of history in Second Amendment cases, he did
raise questions during Heller’s oral argument.124 He expressed doubts
about the tiers of scrutiny, noting that “none of them appear in the
Constitution.”125 The Chief Justice went on to describe these traditional
standards of review as “baggage that the First Amendment picked
up.”126 Instead, Chief Justice Roberts asked whether it was more useful
to examine the founding era to “look at the various regulations that
were available at the time” to see how the challenged regulation
compares.127 Though, during the oral argument for Bruen, the Chief
Justice hinted that the Court may no longer need to look back further
than 2008: “[T]he first thing I would look to in answering this question
See Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 451 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting).
See id. at 452–63. Justice Barrett clarified that her opinion is that the Second Amendment
analysis should proceed under the framework that “all people have the right to keep and bear
arms but that history and tradition support Congress’s power to strip certain groups of that
right.” Id. at 452. She distinguished this from an approach that there are certain groups of
individuals who fall entirely outside of Second Amendment protections. Id. at 451. Though both
methods center on historical analysis, the former identifies the scope of legislative authority to
restrict Second Amendment rights, and the latter is used to determine the scope of the right. Id.
at 452.
122 Id. at 465.
123 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 119, at 55.
124 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)
(No. 07-290).
125 Id. This point was reiterated later by Justice Thomas in multiple dissents from certiorari
denial for Second Amendment cases. See Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 948 n.4 (2018)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I, too, have questioned this Court’s tiers-of-scrutiny jurisprudence.”);
Rogers v. Grewal, 140 S. Ct. 1865, 1867 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Constitution does
not prescribe tiers of scrutiny.” (quoting Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292,
2327 (2016))).
126 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 124, at 44. This sentiment was echoed by Justice
Kavanaugh in the Bruen oral argument, where he questioned why the Court should “smuggle”
these standards into Second Amendment doctrine. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 119,
at 53.
127 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 124, at 44.
120
121
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is not the Statute of Northampton, it’s Heller . . . .”128 Given the
overwhelming support for a historical-review standard, each of the
attorneys participating in the Bruen oral argument focused on history
as well.129
But relying solely on historical analysis is problematic for two very
important reasons. The first is relatively simple and straightforward:
judges are not historians.130 Second Amendment historian Saul Cornell,
for example, states that neither Justice Scalia’s majority opinion nor
Justice Stevens’s dissent in Heller meets the standards of historical
scholarship.131 This may not necessarily be a catastrophic problem, but
it certainly comes closer to one if the entirety of Second Amendment
analysis boils down to judges looking through historical documents in
search of consensus.
Justice Kavanaugh argued in his Heller II dissent that a historical
test would be less subjective than standard forms of scrutiny.132 But
Judge Richard Posner vehemently disagrees. Judge Posner believes that
the vast resources of the Supreme Court enable Justices to find evidence
that will support either side of a case133: the very thing that Justices Scalia

Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 119, at 93–94.
Paul Clement, representing the challengers, requested the Court “say that text, history, and
tradition is the test, not part of the test but the test inside and outside the home.” Id. at 47.
Solicitor General Underwood argued for New York that history and tradition supported the
state’s regulation. Id. at 63. And Deputy Solicitor General Fletcher, arguing on behalf of the
Department of Justice, stated that he believed all parties were on the same page: “As to the general
question about Heller, we agree completely that the Court ought to apply the method from Heller,
which we, like I think all the parties, take to be look to the text, history, and tradition of the
Second Amendment right . . . .” Id. at 95.
130 See generally Richard A. Epstein, A Structural Interpretation of the Second Amendment:
Why Heller Is (Probably) Wrong on Originalist Grounds, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 171 (2008)
(arguing that, while Heller is described as an opinion based in originalism, it gets many aspects
of historical understanding incorrect).
131 Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of Columbia
v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625, 627 (2008).
132 Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Justice Scalia’s concurrence in McDonald that historical analysis “depends
upon a body of evidence susceptible of reasoned analysis rather than a variety of vague ethicopolitical First Principles whose combined conclusion can be found to point in any direction the
judges favor” (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 804 (2010) (Scalia, J.,
concurring))).
133 Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 27, 2008),
https://newrepublic.com/article/62124/defense-looseness
[https://perma.cc/LP6P-94LB]
(“When the clerks are the numerous and able clerks of Supreme Court justices, enjoying the
assistance of the capable staffs of the Supreme Court library and the Library of Congress, and
when dozens and sometimes hundreds of amicus curiae briefs have been filed, many bulked out
with the fruits of their authors’ own law-office historiography, it is a simple matter, especially for
a skillful rhetorician such as Scalia, to write a plausible historical defense of his position.”).
128
129
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and Kavanaugh suggest a historical test prevents.134 Indeed, in
commenting on the Heller decision, Judge Posner was critical of both
Justice Scalia’s and Justice Stevens’s opinions.135
Perhaps what is most troubling about this monopolistic reliance
on history is the misleading notion that it is objective and
straightforward. Most historians appear to agree that there was little
consensus to be uncovered during the founding era, with disagreements
over most constitutional issues.136 Therefore, picking among these
various viewpoints to determine which was the true “meaning”
invariably requires making value choices.137 As Professor Reva Siegel
aptly puts it, “Claims about the past express contemporary identities,
relationships, and concerns, and express deep normative
convictions.”138
For example, Justice Thomas, a fervent proponent of using history,
questioned which states to look to.139 Justice Alito raised doubts about
the use of decisions and statutes in the late nineteenth century and early
twentieth century, despite Heller itself not only relying on this history
but labeling as presumptively lawful laws that did not emerge until the
twentieth century.140 Even deciding how literal to take history is
extremely relevant to the question of a right to carry in public. The
challengers in Bruen argue for a right to concealed carry but, as Justice
Kagan pointed out, history provides more support for a right to open
carry because concealed carry was thought to be nefarious.141 Thus, a
strict reliance on history would provide support for completely different

Heller, 670 F.3d at 1274.
Posner, supra note 133 (“The majority (and the dissent as well) was engaged in what is
derisively referred to—the derision is richly deserved—as ‘law office history.’”).
136 Cornell, supra note 131, at 631; see also Lawrence Rosenthal, The Limits of Second
Amendment Originalism and the Constitutional Case for Gun Control, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1187,
1197–1204 (2015) (describing the difficulty in lower courts of relying on Heller’s originalism and
historical evidence).
137 Even Justice Scalia admitted as much in his McDonald concurrence: “Historical analysis
can be difficult; it sometimes requires resolving threshold questions, and making nuanced
judgments about which evidence to consult and how to interpret it. I will stipulate to that.”
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 803–04.
138 Reva B. Siegel, Heller & Originalism’s Dead Hand—in Theory and Practice, 56 UCLA L.
REV. 1399, 1420 (2009).
139 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 119, at 92–93. Justice Thomas questioned the use
of Western states when examining history because “the west is different.” Id.
140 Id. at 107. General Fletcher rightfully pointed this out in response: “I think it’s fairly read
to extend the analysis into the 20th Century for the reason that Justice Kagan identified, that
[Heller] validated as presumptively lawful felon-in-possession requirements, bans on the
possession of firearms by the mentally ill that date to much later than the 19th Century.” Id.
141 Id. at 40–41.
134
135
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Second Amendment protections than those arguing for a right to
concealed carry.142
Here, though, those arguing for a right to carry firearms in public
ask for “contextual sensitivity.”143 But this is the point. Determining
when, where, and how much flexibility to grant is not an objective
exercise.144 Indeed, this is one of the primary difficulties in looking
solely to history for answers to contemporary problems.145 Though part
of the discussion at the Bruen oral argument focused on what areas or
types of places might warrant firearm restrictions, again the suggestion
was to look back. Yet, determining where to look and how to interpret
what is found are inherently imbued with subjective decision-making.
Even the core of the Second Amendment right—self-defense—can
hardly be considered static through our nation’s history.146 The law of
self-defense was historically used as a defense for a crime, not an overt
right to harm others.147 It included in it a duty to retreat, thereby
incorporating a specific requirement to avoid lethal violence if at all
possible.148 This conception of self-defense has evolved over time,
especially with the growth of stand-your-ground laws.149 And even the
use of self-defense historically as a permissible defense has been
inconsistent, often unavailable to marginalized populations such as
women and people of color.150
What this portends is not history’s irrelevance, but rather its
limitations. Or, perhaps more accurately, the limitations of judges to
access all the relevant documents, understand each completely and
accurately, and make a critical legal determination based on those

Id. at 41–42.
Id. at 43–44.
144 As Justice Kagan asked, “[W]ith what sense of flexibility do you look?” Id. at 41.
145 Id. at 40. Though, acknowledging the difficulty is not to suggest that context should not be
taken into consideration, as the “original meaning can be distorted when framing-era practice is
consulted without reference to historical context.” Rosenthal, supra note 136, at 1208.
146 See generally CAROLINE E. LIGHT, STAND YOUR GROUND: A HISTORY OF AMERICA’S LOVE
AFFAIR WITH LETHAL SELF-DEFENSE (2017).
147 See Eric Ruben, An Unstable Core: Self-Defense and the Second Amendment, 108 CALIF. L.
REV. 63, 82 (2020).
148 Id. at 86.
149 See MARY ANNE FRANKS, THE CULT OF THE CONSTITUTION 93 (2019) (“Florida passed the
first so-called stand-your-ground law in the United States in 2005. Within ten years, thirty-three
states had followed Florida’s lead, transforming the concept of self-defense and use of deadly
force in the United States.”). The American Bar Association has recommended states repeal
stand-your-ground laws because the empirical evidence shows that states with these laws have
increased rates of homicide. AM. BAR ASS’N, NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON STAND YOUR GROUND
LAWS: FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (Sept. 2015), https://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/diversity/SYG_Report_Book.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2022).
150 FRANKS, supra note 149, at 89–99.
142
143
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documents objectively.151 But this is not a standard to which judges
should be held. It is unreasonable to expect judges and their clerks to
produce research and historical analysis to the quality of historians. It
is simultaneously unreasonable then to rely so heavily—or entirely—on
historical interpretation. More importantly, it is unnecessary. As public
health crises evolve and emerge over time, the police power authority
to protect the public’s health, safety, and welfare must be empowered to
respond to those changes.152 Indeed, to maintain a fixed understanding
of the Second Amendment and the limitations it places on government
action would be exceptionalism that distinguishes the right from others
that have evolved over time.153
Take, for example, the Fourth Amendment. Unlike the Second
Amendment, the language of the Fourth is fairly clear in its
requirements for reasonableness and a warrant based on probable
cause.154 But the Court has introduced a number of exceptions over the
years, likely due to the consequence of a warrantless search being that
the evidence obtained is no longer available for prosecution.155 Whether
these exceptions truly represent what the Founders had in mind when
they drafted the Fourth Amendment is a valid question. But even these
exceptions and their boundaries continuously evolve to correspond to
technological advances.156 Now, the Fourth Amendment’s exceptions
take into consideration cell phone contents,157 DNA evidence,158 GPS
tracking,159 and cell-tower data.160
See Cornell, supra note 131, at 639.
Michael R. Ulrich, Revisionist History? Responding to Gun Violence Under Historical
Limitations, 45 AM. J.L. & MED. 188, 200 (2019).
153 See Ulrich, supra note 8, at 1079–84 (demonstrating that other rights have been limited to
protect the public).
154 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
155 Greene, supra note 21, at 126 (labeling these a “patchwork of ad hoc exceptions”).
156 Id. at 36–37 (discussing the Fourth Amendment doctrine’s need for the Court’s “constant
care” by “jerry-rigg[ing]” precedent onto “unforeseen circumstances”).
157 See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385–86 (2014) (finding that police may not search
through a cell phone seized during an arrest).
158 See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 465–66 (2013) (holding that police may take DNA
swabs at arrest).
159 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012) (considering the attachment of a
GPS tracking device to a suspect’s vehicle a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment).
160 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (holding that acquisition of celltower data constituted a Fourth Amendment search). In writing for the majority, Chief Justice
151
152
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This leads to a second objection to a stringent reliance on historical
analysis to determine the constitutionality of firearm regulations; it
ignores the inherent responsiveness that lies within the police powers.161
A historical investigation may be useful in determining what the scope
of the right may have meant when it was ratified, but this should not be
conflated with an impenetrable boundary that can never be breached.
As Professor Cornell notes, the right to carry arms for self-defense was
historically always balanced against public safety, with public safety
finding greater weight in most circumstances.162 Thus, history itself
supports taking into consideration both the right to keep and bear arms
and the potential impact this right has on the safety and well-being of
others.163 The evaluation of the right to self-defense has never been
limited solely to the scope of the right itself. Nor has it been for other
rights.164
The threats and needs of a community change and evolve over
time. If police powers authorize government action to protect the
public’s health, safety, and welfare, what this may require is unlikely to
remain constant over decades and centuries. History supports factoring
in the needs of self-defense and the need to protect the public, but this
does not mean a state is limited to how that calculus was made in the
late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century. What history tells
us is that balancing did occur, but that balance can and does change
over time. It would substantially undermine the central authority of
police power—to effectively protect the public—to limit policy options
to the balancing that was done centuries ago.
Gun violence, as a threat to the public, shares little resemblance to
how gun violence may have been viewed in the founding era. A rightsRoberts made a point to discuss the manner in which advancement in technology must be taken
into consideration by the Court:
The Government’s position fails to contend with the seismic shifts in digital
technology that made possible the tracking of not only Carpenter’s location but also
everyone else’s, not for a short period but for years and years. Sprint Corporation and
its competitors are not your typical witnesses. Unlike the nosy neighbor who keeps an
eye on comings and goings, they are ever alert, and their memory is nearly infallible.
There is a world of difference between the limited types of personal information
addressed in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive chronicle of location information
casually collected by wireless carriers today.
Id. at 2219.
161 Ulrich, supra note 152, at 196–97.
162 Saul Cornell, The Right to Keep and Carry Arms in Anglo-American Law: Preserving Liberty
and Keeping the Peace, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11, 13 (2017).
163 Id. at 14 (“Something analogous to a balancing exercise was fundamental to the way AngloAmerican law dealt with arms throughout [the founding] period.”).
164 Blocher, supra note 7, at 425 (“[M]any enumerated constitutional rights—including the
right to free speech—are subject to balancing.”).
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as-trumps view of the Second Amendment limits policymakers’ options
to tackle this modern problem and protect the rights and well-being of
the public.165 While the rights that act to limit oppressive and arbitrary
government measures may remain constant over time, the justifications
for infringing on those rights do not.166
One of the important aspects of recognizing gun violence as a
public health problem is to remove the notion that it is somehow
random and sporadic.167 To make such a claim is to suggest little can be
done to proactively minimize the harm. Framing gun violence as
chaotic strengthens an individual’s claim that their rights should not
and cannot be limited prospectively. But public health research, with its
growing collection of data on gun violence, makes clear that this is not
simply a matter of personal responsibility.168 The law does and can have
an impact on this growing threat.169
Heller declared that individual self-defense is the underlying value
in the Second Amendment right.170 When considering the right to carry
firearms in public, this is certainly a salient consideration. But selfdefense is not one sided, nor is an individual solely reliant on themselves
for safety.171 Again, the issue is not merely an individual’s right to selfdefense and the government attempting to limit that right.
The Supreme Court has recognized that “[u]pon the principle of
self-defense, of paramount necessity, a community has the right to
protect itself against an epidemic.”172 And we are in the midst of a gun
violence epidemic, where increased firearms in public threatens others
in the community.173 To protect the entire community, people must be
subject to restraints in certain circumstances; otherwise, “organized
society could not exist with safety to its members.”174 Consequently,
“[r]estrictions on who may bear weapons, of what types, and where
165 Greene, supra note 21, at 37 (“[T]he categorical frame’s fixation on policing the borders of
political authority can deny the protection of rights at just the point when protection is most
urgent.”).
166 For a contemporary example, consider a mandate for people to wear masks in public.
Despite the relatively minor burden this would entail, it very likely may have been struck down
due to a lack of justification in 2019. But in 2020, after the emergence of Covid-19, the state has
a stronger justification for requiring masks in public settings. The rights of the individual have
not changed but the circumstances and threats to the public have and, therefore, so too has the
state’s authority to infringe on individual rights by mandating masks in certain locations.
167 See infra text accompanying notes 339–41.
168 See infra Section III.B.
169 See infra Section III.B.
170 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008).
171 Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 671 (1st Cir. 2018).
172 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905).
173 Donohue, Aneja & Weber, supra note 11, at 199.
174 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26.
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cannot, ipso facto, violate the constitution of a functioning society.”175
Attempts to interpret the Second Amendment through a rigid historical
framework has led to the confusing mess seen in the lower courts and
has done little to determine how we move forward in balancing the selfdefense interests of the entire community.176
In an effort to protect itself against the broad harm caused by
firearms, a community may wish to limit—not eliminate entirely—the
number of firearms in public. To do so, the people may elect officials
who promise to reduce gun violence. Limiting the community’s options
for self-defense to policies that can be directly tied to founding era
legislation ignores the drastic changes that have taken place in the
centuries that have followed.177
To wit: On August 4, 2019, Connor Stephen Betts, a twenty-fouryear-old white man, opened fire in downtown Dayton, Ohio.178 He
could only fire his weapon for thirty seconds before police officers on
patrol stopped him by returning fire.179 Armed with a magazine that
held one hundred rounds of ammunition, Betts was able to strike
twenty-six people, nine of whom died.180 This scenario could hardly
have been imagined at the founding.181
Urbanization has created much more densely populated areas.182
Requiring that citizens be allowed an unfettered right to carry firearms

Greene, supra note 21, at 52.
Id. (describing how application of a rights-as-trumps framing to Second Amendment
rights has “produced considerable confusion”).
177 Posner, supra note 133 (noting that the Second Amendment is a “constitutional provision
ratified more than two centuries ago, dealing with a subject that has been transformed in the
intervening period by social and technological change, including urbanization and a revolution
in warfare and weaponry”).
178 Adeel Hassan, Dayton Gunman’s Friend Bought Body Armor and Ammunition, Authorities
Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/12/us/connor-betts-ethankollie.html [https://perma.cc/8GE2-HHT3].
179 Id.
180 Tresa Baldas, Rachel Berry & Monroe Trombly, Who Is the 24-Year-Old Man Police Say
Killed 9—Including His Own Sister—in Dayton, Ohio?, USA TODAY (Aug. 5, 2019, 9:46 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/08/04/ohio-shooting-connor-bettsidentified-police-dayton-gunman/1916170001
[https://perma.cc/GUR6-ZY2V];
Bill
Hutchinson, Families of Dayton Mass Shooting Victims Sue Maker of 100-round Magazine Used
by Gunman, ABC NEWS (Aug. 2, 2021, 6:14 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/families-daytonmass-shooting-victims-sue-maker-100/story?id=79219747 [https://perma.cc/B28C-A5WP].
181 See Jack N. Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, 76 CHI.KENT L. REV. 103, 110 (2000) (“[B]ecause eighteenth-century firearms were not nearly as
threatening or lethal as those available today, we similarly cannot expect the discussants of the
late 1780s to have cast their comments about keeping and bearing arms in the same terms that
we would.”).
182 See Posner, supra note 133 (describing the importance of urbanization in altering the social
landscape since the founding era).
175
176
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in public spaces clearly raises different safety issues today—specifically
in urban areas—than it did near the turn of the nineteenth century.183
Changes in technology have made firearms significantly more lethal.184
People can purchase bullets that are designed to expand once they strike
a person to maximize damage.185 Large-capacity magazines can enable
a person to fire dozens, or even hundreds, of bullets in a matter of
seconds, placing bystanders at risk.186 Firearms can even be modified
with relative ease to increase their lethality.187 This is especially
troubling when considering firearms in densely populated public
settings.
To suggest this has no relevance in determining the
constitutionality of state action, due to disagreements over any direct
lineal descendant, disregards that the underlying reasons for the state’s
police power authority is to protect its people.188 This approach also
renders emerging empirical data practically irrelevant. Public health
research on gun violence, and the impact the law can have on
minimizing or exacerbating that harm, has grown in recent years. But
the impact this knowledge can have is suppressed if laws are limited to
historical analogues. Ignoring empirical data, or minimizing its
relevance, avoids the real-world impact of Second Amendment

183 Blocher, Firearm Localism, supra note 10, at 115 (“[G]un violence simply was not the
problem then that it would later become.”). Though, as Professor Blocher notes, there was still a
considerable amount of firearm regulation during this era. Id.; cf. Michael Siegel et al., The Impact
of State Firearm Laws on Homicide Rates in Suburban and Rural Areas Compared to Large Cities
in the United States, 1991–2016, 36 J. RURAL HEALTH 255, 262 (2020) (describing the differences
in firearm laws in urban versus rural areas).
184 Bindu Kalesan et al., A Multi-Decade Joinpoint Analysis of Firearm Injury Severity, 3
TRAUMA SURGERY & ACUTE CARE OPEN 1, 5–6 (2018); see also Anthony A. Braga & Philip J.
Cook, The Association of Firearm Caliber with Likelihood of Death from Gunshot Injury in
Criminal Assaults, 1 JAMA NETWORK OPEN 1, 7 (2018) (finding a connection between injury
severity and caliber of firearms).
185 See Melissa Chan, They Survived Mass Shootings. Years Later, the Bullets Are Still Trying
to Kill Them, TIME (May 31, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://time.com/longform/gun-violencesurvivors-lead-poisoning [https://perma.cc/N77L-6Y6G] (describing the health troubles of
individuals with bullet fragments left in their bodies from bullets that have exploded inside of
them).
186 See supra note 180 and accompanying text; Hutchinson, supra note 180.
187 Jeremy White, When Lawmakers Try to Ban Assault Weapons, Gunmakers Adapt, N.Y.
TIMES (July 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/07/31/us/assault-weaponsban.html [https://perma.cc/X4CL-U92N].
188 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (“[T]he police power of a state must be
held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established directly by legislative enactment
as will protect the public health and the public safety.”).
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II. REFRAMING THE ANALYSIS
The Second Amendment doctrine’s current state of disorder could
find some relief with an upcoming decision from the Supreme Court in
Bruen. But given the likely reliance on history, a clear path forward may
remain elusive. As discussed above, the focus on history has not helped
build consensus in the lower courts, and history does not provide the
objective, straightforward answers that some proponents of this
methodology might suggest. More importantly, this backward-looking
review standard ignores the realities of our time and the impact that gun
violence has had across the country.
A shift from the unending search for truth in the annals of history
to an approach that contextualizes the analysis within the current gun
violence epidemic is what the Second Amendment needs.190 Utilization
of history can present a false objectivity that creates a veil for modern
beliefs and contemporary concerns.191 Instead, placing the discussion in
the current context can increase transparency and better inform the
public as to the stakes of the debate.192 Rather than perpetuate the
conflict as one of freedom versus an overzealous government,

189 Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1049,
1067 (2006) (discussing the relevance that practical implications should have on judicial
decisions).
190 Siegel, supra note 138, at 1403 (“The living advocate their normative views by appeal to
historical narratives the community shares, and through these practices of constitutional dispute
sustain community in disagreement.”).
191 Id. at 1421 (“Claims on the founding not only express contemporary concerns; they express
contemporary conflicts.”). According to Professor Siegel, even the Heller opinion does not, in
fact, reflect an originalist interpretation of the right based solely on historical interpretation, but
instead “arises out of a quite contemporary and still persisting dispute about the nature and scope
of our constitutional freedoms.” Id. at 1402. Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson was even more critical in
his assessment of the Heller majority, believing it “encourages Americans to do what conservative
jurists warned for years they should not do: bypass the ballot and seek to press their political
agenda.” J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L.
REV. 253, 254 (2009).
192 Greene, supra note 21, at 33 (“[L]ack of transparency about the basis for decision is a ruleof-law problem that the rights-as-trump frame invites.”); see also Blocher, supra note 7, at 428
(“[B]alancing approaches may be better equipped to deal with a pluralism of values and with
areas where underlying values are disputed.”). If the balancing of interests continues to result in
the same outcome, a categorical approach may emerge: “Balancing approaches, on the other
hand, give courts the opportunity to weigh competing values in a series of cases, and if one value
consistently outweighs the other, a categorical rule may develop.” Id. at 429. But this emergence
comes from continued evaluation and consensus, rather than a decree from a higher court.
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incorporating gun violence and the potential harm from a proliferation
of firearms in public provides a more accurate depiction of the what is
actually at issue.193
To be sure, the Court has emphasized the importance of context
with regard to other fundamental rights. Consider the First
Amendment right to free speech, a popular area for Second
Amendment guidance.194 In Virginia v. Black, the Court considered
limitations on cross burning, an act previously deemed protected by the
First Amendment as expressive conduct.195 But, recognizing that First
Amendment protections are not absolute, the Court held that the
context in which the cross burning occurred could be used to determine
a motive of intimidation, thereby removing constitutional protection.196
Despite a prior ruling protecting this conduct, its use to intimidate
altered the Court’s analysis.197 The right had not changed, but the
context in which it was exercised and the effects of exercising that right
had changed. Therefore, the conduct could be limited because the First
Amendment permitted content regulation when the benefit is “clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”198
Similarly, an increase in guns in the public sphere has the potential
to cause fear, apprehension, mental duress, and changes in lifestyle of
those who seek to avoid firearms and the risk they entail.199 While this
may not be dispositive of a constitutional analysis, it certainly seems
relevant—at least the Court thought so with regard to First Amendment
considerations.200 To incorporate those concerns places everyone’s
rights and interests on equal footing. It is important that people begin
to see themselves as cohabitors of the polity, as opposed to enemies on
the constitutional battleground: one with a right worth protecting and

193 Greene, supra note 21, at 30 (describing a rights-as-trumps framing that focuses entirely
on the scope of the right as one that “has special pathologies that ill prepare its practitioners to
referee the paradigmatic conflicts of a modern, pluralistic political order”).
194 Even Paul Clement, arguing against New York’s good cause restriction in Bruen, stated
that “there is a lot of useful teaching in the First Amendment.” Transcript of Oral Argument,
supra note 119, at 56.
195 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
196 Id. at 358–59.
197 Id. at 363.
198 Id. at 358–59 (emphasis added) (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83
(1992)).
199 Sarah R. Lowe & Sandro Galea, The Mental Health Consequences of Mass Shootings, 18
TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 62, 62 (2017).
200 See Black, 538 U.S. at 360 (weighing First Amendment protections against the state’s effort
to “‘protect[] individuals from the fear of violence’ and ‘from the disruption that fear engenders,’
in addition to protecting people ‘from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur’”
(internal citations omitted)).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3810404

1410

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:4

the other aggressively seeking to destroy that right.201 To simplify
constitutional determination to the founding makes this goal much
more difficult because, as Professor Jamal Greene puts it, “[w]hen rights
are trumps, constitutional validity can turn on a contested interpretive
judgment that flattens a rich set of empirical questions and normative
judgments into a dull heuristic.”202
A.

Second Amendment in Context

The heated debate over the contours of the Second Amendment
right, both in the public arena and within the legal academy, focuses
heavily on terms such as long-standing, fundamental, self-defense, and
law-abiding citizen. But the use of these terms in the abstract can
obscure the real-world impact of these constitutional determinations.
The judiciary—as well as the broader legal academy—cannot and
should not discuss these issues in isolation from the broader context of
what it means to declare certain conduct with firearms not simply
protected but completely outside of the reach of government regulation.
For public carry, this is particularly relevant.
Consider, for example, shopping at a local Walmart when a man
walks into the store with a tactical rifle slung across his chest and
carrying a handgun. What would the average citizen do? Call the police?
Flee the store or pull out their own firearm? Allow the individual to walk
about the store to shop? More pointedly, how can a person know
whether this man is a law-abiding citizen or someone who intends to
commit an act of violence?
On August 8, 2019, in Springfield, Missouri, twenty-year-old
Dmitriy Andreychenko entered Walmart armed with a rifle, believing
he was simply exercising his Second Amendment right to carry a
firearm openly in public.203 Five days prior, on August 3, in El Paso,
Texas, it was Patrick Crusius, a twenty-one-year-old white man, who
was armed and entered Walmart with the intent to kill Latinx

201 Greene, supra note 21, at 131 (arguing for a judicial approach where all citizens understand
that they are rights-bearers who must share space within a working ecosystem).
202 Id. at 119.
203 Neil Vigdor, Armed Man Who Caused Panic at Missouri Walmart Said It Was 2nd
Amendment Test, Authorities Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
08/09/us/missouri-walmart-terrorist-threat.html [https://perma.cc/R23U-TDNC]; Chris Perez,
Man Who Walked into Walmart with “Tactical Rifle” Says He Was Testing 2nd Amendment, N.Y.
POST (Aug. 9, 2019, 11:52 PM), https://nypost.com/2019/08/09/man-who-walked-into-walmartwith-tactical-rifle-says-he-was-testing-2nd-amendment [https://perma.cc/9DZC-DMKF].
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immigrants.204 Both men were law-abiding citizens until the point when
one decided to pull the trigger.
Carrying a high-powered firearm and hundreds of rounds of
ammunition may seem like the rare, extreme scenario. Many seeking
public carry would be likely to carry handguns.205 Yet, a change in
weapon hardly solves the problem of an individual trying to determine
who may or may not use a handgun for violence. Thus, the question
remains, how can the average individual shopper be expected to know
the difference?
The theoretical framing of the law-abiding citizen has rhetorical
force but is disconnected from the reality of gun violence. It ignores the
ability of the average citizen to distinguish who is and will remain a lawabiding citizen. This framing also fails to recognize that the presence of
firearms can create more harmful violence from everyday occurrences
like road rage, arguments, and fights.206 Not to mention that the average
person’s assessment and judgment in any given situation is inevitably
going to be imbued with biases.207 When dealing with lethal weapons,
these decisions have deadly consequences.
But complications arise not only from the average person trying to
discern which armed individuals may pose a threat. In Portland,
Oregon, in July 2018, a concealed carry permit holder attempted to
break up a fight, but when the police arrived and saw his weapon drawn,
they shot and killed him by mistake.208 In a November 2017 shooting in
Colorado, the police had difficulty determining the “good guys with
guns” from the “bad guys with guns” after a number of Walmart
shoppers pulled out their weapons in response to a shooting.209 Trained
law enforcement are sometimes unable to decipher who is law abiding
and who is not. This creates risk not only for the “good Samaritan” who

204 Anya van Wagtendonk, Sean Collins & German Lopez, El Paso Walmart Shooting: What
We Know, VOX (Aug. 6, 2019, 9:15 AM), https://www.vox.com/2019/8/3/20753049/el-pasowalmart-cielo-vista-mall-shooting-what-we-know [https://perma.cc/5WVW-AFLU].
205 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008) (referring to handguns as the
preferred firearm in the nation to use for protection).
206 Donohue, Aneja & Weber, supra note 11, at 204.
207 “[T]he most common stereotype applied to blacks appears to involve linking them to crime
and violence. Moreover, this latter association appears to be bidirectional: ‘Black faces and Black
bodies can trigger thoughts of crime, [just as] thinking of crime can trigger thoughts of Black
people.’” Adam Benforado, Quick on the Draw: Implicit Bias and the Second Amendment, 89 OR.
L. REV. 1, 40 (2010) (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
208 Donohue, Aneja & Weber, supra note 11, at 212.
209 Id. This point was raised by Solicitor General Underwood as one of the justifications for
New York’s good cause law. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 119, at 70.
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may be trying to help, but for the broader public given the
complications this can create for apprehending criminals as well.210
But these facts are noticeably absent in far too many Second
Amendment discussions and judicial opinions, both those striking
down and those upholding statutes such as good cause restrictions. And
when public impact does garner some discussion, it is nearly always far
less than the historical record.211 This results in a rights-centric
framework that does not take into account the manner in which rights
can be limited.212 The scope of a right is not—and historically has not
been—dispositive in determining whether a law is constitutional.213
Even if rights may not evolve and change over time, the state’s
justification for infringing on rights can and indeed does ebb and
flow.214 Consequently, an analysis of a public carry restriction such as a
good cause law that does not thoroughly factor in the current state of
gun violence and why a good cause restriction may have a chance to
mitigate that violence is flawed.

210 Another incident involved a concealed carry permit holder at an Alabama mall who the
police shot and killed because he had his gun drawn, while the actual suspect escaped. Donohue,
Aneja & Weber, supra note 11, at 212.
211 For example, in doing a rough, unscientific examination of the Kachalsky opinion, it
appears that over 2,600 words are spent on history while less than 800 are spent on the public’s
and the state’s interest in protecting their health and safety. And this opinion stated definitively
that it rejected the centrality of history in reaching its conclusion. See Kachalsky v. County of
Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012).
212 Greene, supra note 21, at 72 (explaining that a rights-centric approach often lacks the
understanding that government regulation can be done to further constitutional rights as
opposed to simply aiming to limit them).
213 See id. at 34 (“The U.S. Supreme Court balances pervasively, and what categories it
maintains are riddled with exceptions.”). This has historically been the case for the right to carry
firearms in public as well. Cornell, supra note 162, at 43 (“A systematic survey of popular guides
to the law aimed at justices of the peace, constables, and other peace officers provides an excellent
set of sources for exploring how the concepts of self-defense, the right to keep or travel with arms,
and the need to balance these claims against the preservation of the peace evolved in the more
than two centuries following the Glorious Revolution.”).
214 “[O]rdinary judicial scrutiny hardly handicaps governmental responses to public health
emergencies, largely because most modern constitutional standards of review turn on some
assessment, whether explicitly or implicitly, of proportionality—‘the idea that larger harms
imposed by government should be justified by more weighty reasons.’” Lindsay F. Wiley &
Stephen I. Vladeck, Coronavirus, Civil Liberties, and the Courts: The Case Against “Suspending”
Judicial Review, 133 HARV. L. REV. F. 179, 188–89 (2020); see also Siegel, supra note 138, at 1423
(“Collective memory thus constitutes community and then supplies a language for its members
to argue with one another about the community’s grounds and aims, enabling it to evolve in
history.”).
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Rights-only rhetoric is damaging not only to constitutional law,
but to the public’s understanding of their rights as well.215 A gun-rights
advocate such as Andreychenko, the twenty-year-old who walked into
a Missouri Walmart armed like a man ready to go to war, may believe
his Second Amendment right is absolute. As a result, he may argue that
while the shooting in El Paso was tragic, one man’s misuse of firearms
should not impact his own constitutional rights.216 But as the
comparison of the armed Walmart customers demonstrates, this view
ignores the constitutionally relevant consideration of the government’s
authority to protect the public, as well as the limitations the public has
in protecting themselves. Moreover, this ignores the impact the judicial
rulings from a rights-as-trumps approach would have on the rights and
liberties of the rest of the community.217 In sticking with this frame, it
furthers the individualistic approach to rights that only stands to create
more ardent animosity between proponents of gun rights and gun
control.218
The law-abiding citizen language used to protect Second
Amendment rights also limits the state to reactive measures—ones in
which the government, for the most part, must wait until someone pulls
a trigger and takes themselves out of the law-abiding category. Not only
has the reactive approach—relying on criminal enforcement—been
unsuccessful, but it places the onus on the average citizen to make
difficult decisions. They can place themselves at some unknown risk in
public spaces, limit their right to move freely by staying out of the
public, or perhaps more concerning, choose to take proactive measures

215 Greene, supra note 21, at 33 (“Constitutional law is not just a set of foundational rules and
standards that govern the structure of the constituted government and the behavior of its actors.
It is also a style of—a grammar for—political argument.”).
216 A more extreme stance, though one that is certainly not hard to find, is that incidents like
the El Paso shooting mean that more individuals should be armed in public to help stop the harm
as quickly as possible. See, e.g., Lindsey Bever, These GOP Lawmakers Are Pushing for More Gun
Rights After Baseball Shooting, WASH. POST (June 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/powerpost/wp/2017/06/19/these-gop-lawmakers-are-pushing-for-more-gun-rights-afterbaseball-shooting [https://perma.cc/C486-CRC5].
217 Siegel & Blocher, supra note 18, at 13 (“[G]un violence can dramatically restrict exercise
of a wide range of freedoms, many of them constitutionally guaranteed liberties.”).
218 See Greene, supra note 21, at 34. As Professor Greene puts it, the connection between
societal views of rights and constitutional debates are connected to the manner in which the
Court evaluates constitutional questions. The rights-as-trumps approach takes us further from
finding common ground because “[t]he frame requires us to formulate constitutional politics as
a battle between those who are of constitutional concern and those who are not. It coarsens us,
and by leaving us farther apart at the end of a dispute than we were at the beginning, it diminishes
us.” Id.
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for their own protection.219 Encouraging people to arm themselves if
they fear the risk of gun violence could lead to a proliferation of armed
civilians in public spaces, which has the potential to exacerbate gun
violence rather than minimize it.220
B.

A Population-Based View of Protection

A major discrepancy between the circuits has been over grounding
the right in self-defense. The need for self-defense could arise anywhere
at any time, a point acknowledged even by the Second Circuit despite
upholding the state limitation on public carry.221 This is because the
Second Circuit, along with some other courts, believes that this fact
alone does not negate the ability to regulate gun rights anywhere that
confrontation may occur.222 The Wrenn court clearly disagrees. In its
framing, if the core of the right is self-defense, the state must enable
access to firearms in spaces where self-defense might be necessary.223
This latter understanding is difficult to square with many of the
long-standing prohibitions that Heller expressly labels presumptively
lawful. The D.C. Circuit attempted to explain away the sensitive-places
prohibition due to alternative channels for public carry,224 by claiming
this restriction is justifiable because those who wish to carry can simply
avoid those sensitive places, representing only a minimal impact on
most people’s right to bear arms in public.225 But this reasoning actually
highlights the narrow perspective the court uses.226 The court focused
219 See Joseph Blocher, The Right Not to Keep or Bear Arms, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1, 45 (2012)
(“[C]oncealed carry laws affect the self-defense interests not only of those who wish to carry guns,
but also of those who wish to avoid keeping them.”). Professor Blocher has also raised the
question of whether the Second Amendment contains some right to avoid firearms, similar to
the right not to speak protected by the First Amendment. Id.
220 See infra Section III.B.
221 Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 100 (2d Cir. 2012).
222 Id.
223 See Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 657 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
224 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (“[N]othing in our opinion should
be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on . . . laws forbidding the carrying of
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings . . . .”).
225 Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 662.
226 This also ignores the other prohibitions mentioned in Heller. For example, it would seem
unconstitutional to insist that any person with a mental illness has no right to firearms for selfdefense anywhere, at any time. And there are no alternative channels left for their ability to
protect themselves with firearms to ensure their own safety. The accepted prohibitions based on
convictions of a felony or sales to minors raise similar questions of this core need for self-defense.
See Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An
Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1499–1508 (2009). And
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only on the those who wish to carry firearms and how a restriction on
public carry impacts them.
Just as restrictions on public carry may impact where those who
wish to be armed may go, so too can widespread public carry influence
the behavior of those who prefer to avoid firearms. Yet, the Wrenn
opinion paid no attention to the rights of others who may no longer feel
they can move freely throughout their community due to a fear of
firearms proliferation in public.227 And in ignoring this consideration,
they discounted the state’s interest in protecting the rights and liberties
of the broader population.228 This helps to illustrate why a populationbased view—which factors in the rights and well-being of all the people
affected—is essential to a complete constitutional analysis.229
Indeed, the presumptively lawful prohibitions included in Justice
Scalia’s Heller opinion seem to indicate a concern for the public’s wellbeing. No justification, citation, or constitutional value is provided for
accepting the stated prohibitions as presumptively lawful.230 Some may
point to an originalist justification that these were present or
understood to be accepted at the time of the Amendment’s ratification.
However, bans on felons and the mentally ill possessing firearms arose
in the twentieth century.231 As then-Judge Barrett pointed out in Kanter
v. Barr, to suggest that felons and the mentally ill are simply outside of
the scope of Second Amendment protections would be “an unusual way
of thinking about rights.”232 Rather than simply identifying the scope of
the right—and who or what is excluded at the time of ratification—

despite the D.C. Circuit’s quick dismissal of the sensitive-places ban, an individual could certainly
need self-defense in certain “sensitive” locations, and avoiding them limits their access to certain
important spaces. See id. at 1530.
227 Blocher, supra note 219, at 45.
228 “That feeling of security is part of the argument for a broad right to keep and bear
arms. . . . [T]he argument goes both ways: advocates of gun regulation seek the same freedom
and security through the democratic politics.” Siegel & Blocher, supra note 18, at 15.
229 In addition to its protection of individual rights, constitutional law is also “concerned with
the structure and organization of government, subjects that necessarily implicate the political
question of how to organize groups and arrange power between them.” WENDY E. PARMET,
POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE LAW 55–56 (2009). Population-based legal analysis
helps to resist an “unsophisticated and overly deferential stance to public health evidence” as well
as reconcile “public health protections with important legal safeguards.” Id. at 44.
230 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008). “[T]he Court’s discussion of
presumptively lawful gun-control measures is in considerable tension with its conclusions
regarding the original meaning of the Second Amendment’s operative clause.” Rosenthal, supra
note 136, at 1194.
231 Larson, supra note 7, at 1376.
232 Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 452 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting).
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Judge Barrett suggested the better approach was to consider the scope
of the authority to limit that right.233
Following this approach, a simpler and clearer explanation would
be that while all people have a Second Amendment right, that right may
be limited for some people in certain circumstances under a concern for
public safety.234 Indeed, given the fact that most gun control measures,
if not all of them, are passed in accordance with the government’s
interest in protecting the public, this conclusion seems logical. Long
accepted as a compelling government interest,235 protecting the public
provides a clear justification for regulating gun rights, at least to some
degree. Heller seems to recognize that while the Second Amendment
provides an individual right, lawmakers can limit this right in certain
circumstances in the interest of safety.236 Consequently, protecting the
public appears to be an acceptable—if not the only justifiable—reason
for limiting that right.
This raises doubt that defining the exact boundaries of the Second
Amendment should end the analysis, or how central this determination
should be to the outcome. In many of the cases discussed above—both
those that upheld good cause restrictions and those that struck them
down—the focus was almost entirely on the scope of the right. For the
D.C. Circuit, for example, the question was simply whether public carry
was at the core of the right.237 This was, in essence, the beginning and
the end of the analysis.238 But Heller recognizes authority to limit the
right.239 So, too, does history.240 In that sense, focusing solely on the core
of the right is too narrow a lens.
Regardless of the scope of Second Amendment protections, the key
questions are when and how Second Amendment rights, including the
right to public carry, can be limited to protect the public. The D.C.
233 Id. at 452–53. Chief Justice Roberts has made this point as well: “The Constitution gives
you that right. And if someone’s going to take it away from you, they have to justify it.” Transcript
of Oral Argument, supra note 119, at 94.
234 Whether these restrictions have empirical justifications for protecting safety is another
matter.
235 See Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“[G]un laws almost
always aim at the most compelling goal—saving lives . . . .”).
236 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008).
237 Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 664–65.
238 See id. at 665.
239 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
240 According to Justice Sotomayor, the only way to avoid the fact that states have historically
enacted regulations on these rights is to “sort of mak[e] it up and say[] there’s a right to control
states that has never been exercised in the entire history of the United States as to how far they
can go in saying this poses a danger.” Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 119, at 19. Justice
Barrett also suggested the historical record demands accepting that states outlawed guns in
certain areas. Id. at 30–31.
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Circuit has drawn the line at infringing on “law-abiding citizens.” But
this type of analysis lacks the necessary examination of whether the
government has a justification for limiting the right to public carry. In
short, these decisions fail to conduct half of the analysis.
Heller describes the Second Amendment as codifying a preexisting
right of self-defense, providing historical grounding for the
fundamental nature of this right.241 But, looking to the other side of the
equation, there is an equally strong historical foundation for state action
to protect the public from individuals exercising their rights in a
manner that may place others at risk,242 including the right to bear
arms.243 Indeed, the police powers, which authorize the state to protect
public health and safety, predate the Constitution.244 Yet, this fact is
frequently absent from the historical examination found in nearly every
Second Amendment opinion.
Police powers are the sovereign authority of each state to restrict
rights—including fundamental rights—under certain circumstances to
protect the public.245 This is largely because organized society requires
those who take part to sacrifice some freedoms for the benefit of all who
are a part of the political community.246 This creates an inherent
partnership, a connection that recognizes that pursuit of the common
good benefits everyone.247 In more specific terms, the social contract
means that in return for sacrificing unfettered freedom, individuals can
rightly expect the governing body to protect and provide for all in some
manner.248 Consequently, the government’s legitimacy is strongly tied
to the protection and promotion of public health and safety.249 As the
gun violence epidemic grows, this means that citizens may rightly call
for elected officials to take some action to mitigate the growing threat.

Heller, 554 U.S. at 603.
Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the Constitution: Public Health and the Role of the State
in the Framing Era, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 267, 312–14 (1992) (explaining the importance of
the state protecting public health in the Framing Era).
243 Cornell, supra note 162, at 43 (“The notion that the right of self-defense had to be balanced
against the necessity to keep the peace was central to the way the common law dealt with arms.”).
244 Parmet, supra note 242, at 272 (describing the police power as a plenary source of state
authority).
245 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25–26 (1905).
246 See generally Parmet, supra note 242, at 308–12.
247 See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27 (“[I]t was laid down as a fundamental principle of the social
compact that the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole
people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for ‘the common good’ . . . .”).
248 Parmet, supra note 242, at 309.
249 See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26 (“There are manifold restraints to which every person is
necessarily subject for the common good. On any other basis organized society could not exist
with safety to its members.”).
241
242
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This helps to demonstrate the importance of a population-based
perspective. In any particular challenge, the plaintiff is almost certain to
claim they pose little to no risk to the public. And that may in fact be
true. Even acknowledging the state has police power authority to
proactively minimize harm to the public, there is difficulty in predicting
with any accuracy whether any specific individual will cause that harm.
This creates a powerful argument for any individual claim where the
burden on the right is apparent—especially if considered juxtaposed
with the theoretical notion that self-defense needs could arise at any
moment—while the benefits to the public of that burden are difficult to
ascertain.
But while any individual would contend that their probability of
generating harm is quite small, in the aggregate that probability grows
significantly. For while it may be impossible to accurately predict which
individuals will misuse their firearms and when, it is a certainty that
many will. Moreover, risk is not simply a question of probability, but
magnitude as well. And the magnitude of the harm generated by
firearms is unquestionably significant.
Harm, too, takes on a different meaning under a population-based
lens. If a challenger were to misuse their firearm, the harm from that
person could undoubtedly be substantial. But at a population level,
especially for vulnerable, marginalized, and underserved communities,
the harm is even greater. For example, firearms are responsible for
eighty-seven percent of homicides for youths ten to nineteen years of
age.250 Black people suffer firearm injuries at four times the rate of their
white counterparts.251 And gun violence tends to be disproportionately
located in impoverished communities.252
While being shot, whether injured or killed, is certainly tragic,
these are not the only harms caused by firearms. Those who are
fortunate enough to survive a gunshot wound suffer from chronic
complications and many will ultimately die specifically from those
complications.253 Not to mention the burden on the caregivers who tend
250 Scott R. Kegler, Linda L. Dahlberg & James A. Mercy, Firearm Homicides and Suicides in
Major Metropolitan Areas—United States, 2012–2013 and 2015–2016, 67 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1233, 1234 (2018).
251 Bindu Kalesan et al., The Hidden Epidemic of Firearm Injury: Increasing Firearm Injury
Rates During 2001–2013, 185 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 546, 550 (2017).
252 David A. Larsen et al., Spatio-Temporal Patterns of Gun Violence in Syracuse, New York
2009–2015, 12 PLOS ONE 1, 2 (2017).
253 Kalesan et al., supra note 251, at 546; see also Katherine A. Fowler, Linda L. Dahlberg,
Tadesse Haileyesus & Joseph L. Annest, Firearm Injuries in the United Sates, 79 PREVENTATIVE
MED. 5, 9 (2015) (finding firearms to be the leading cause of spinal cord injuries and more likely
to result in paraplegia than other causes). Lead poisoning from bullet fragments lodged inside
victims has now become an increasing problem. See Chan, supra note 185.
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to these victims.254 Even for those who escape the bullets, there is
growing evidence of the deleterious mental health impact from
exposure to shootings.255 Posttraumatic-stress, anxiety, depression, and
trauma are common for those who are exposed to gun violence.256
There is also the fear generated from this national crisis. A majority
of high school students now report concerns about a shooting taking
place in their school or community.257 A proper examination of a
firearm regulation should consider the probability and magnitude of
harm in the context of the population to whom it applies. Whether it is
a city, county, state, or nation, the probability of harm grows when the
analysis looks beyond those challenging the law. When doing so, the
probability and magnitude—the risk—of harm will undoubtedly look
quite different.
When discussing firearms in public, this data seems particularly
relevant, yet it is rarely, if ever, mentioned. It seems reasonable to
suggest that shootings in public spaces are especially likely to increase
these exposure-based harms. An increase in apprehension, even for
those who are not directly exposed, also seems probable if an
unconstrained right to public carry becomes a Supreme Court decree.
There may be a growing number of people who fear for their safety in
schools, stores, movie theaters, concerts, churches, and other public
gatherings. This exhibits how a broad right to carry can impact the
freedoms of others. The circuit courts disagreed over the general

254 The organization Everytown for Gun Safety estimates individuals, families, and
communities lose $51.2 billion annually in income due to gun violence. This includes the wages
lost for unpaid caregiver work for victims. EVERYTOWN RSCH. & POL’Y, THE ECONOMIC COST OF
GUN VIOLENCE (2021), https://everytownresearch.org/report/the-economic-cost-of-gunviolence/#conclusion [https://perma.cc/W9C9-Q7EM].
255 See The Uninjured Victims of the Virginia Tech Shootings, NPR (Apr. 14, 2017, 3:12 PM),
https://www.npr.org/transcripts/523042249 [https://perma.cc/49B4-DCRF].
256 Id.
257 GIFFORDS L. CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, PROTECTING THE PARKLAND
GENERATION: STRATEGIES TO KEEP AMERICA’S KIDS SAFE FROM GUN VIOLENCE 12 (2018). This
occurs through media coverage as well as the increasing prevalence of active shooter drills, which
often create feelings of trauma more so than safety and preparedness. See Adam K. Raymond,
How Active Shooter Drills Became a Big (and Possibly Traumatizing) Business, MEDIUM: GEN
(Sept. 12, 2018), https://gen.medium.com/the-response-to-school-shootings-may-be-a-misfireactive-shooter-drills-teachers-students-6acb56418062 [https://perma.cc/9W8K-JZMN]; Alia E.
Dastagir, “Terrified”: Teachers, Kids Hit Hard by Shooter Drills, USA TODAY (Mar. 22, 2019, 8:06
PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/investigations/2019/03/22/indiana-shooter-drilllockdowns-mock-active-shooters-traumatic/3247173002
[https://perma.cc/8GWS-FASG];
Michael O’Connor, “She Literally Thought She Was Going to Die”: Short Pump Middle School
Held Unannounced Active Shooter Drill Tuesday, RICHMOND-TIMES DISPATCH (May 31, 2018),
https://fredericksburg.com/news/state_region/she-literally-thought-she-was-going-to-dieshort-pump-middle-school-held-unannounced-active/article_25285f0b-40fc-590d-a81bb8715f8980b1.html [https://perma.cc/BF47-2BXU].
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historical treatment of rights inside the home as compared to in
public.258 But no one can disagree that shootings in public expose more
people than do tragedies that occur inside a residence. In the public
setting, many may also feel greater fear, anxiety, and stress than they do
in their own home due to the lack of control over the actions of
strangers.
Historically speaking, the state has had greater authority to act
when the public is less able to protect themselves.259 As discussed, the
public’s ability to decipher who may be a threat and who may be a lawabiding citizen is limited. An unassailable right to concealed carry
would make it even more difficult for people to take protective actions.
With firearms hidden from plain sight, those seeking to limit their
exposure to firearms would be unable to take proactive measures.260
It is this knowledge that should be considered when examining
restrictions on guns in public spaces. Laws are meant to govern the
masses, and to narrow them to a microexamination of the burdens and
risks of an individual claimant discounts this truism. Therefore, the
individual right is but one aspect of the evaluation. The manner in
which that right can and does impact others is constitutionally germane
as well. In realizing this, the search for the Second Amendment’s
historical truth should be less essential. Instead, the issue is whether
there is enough justification for government action in public to warrant
a greater limitation on the Second Amendment right.
III. BATTLE OVER THE PUBLIC SQUARE
If we were to reject the categorical, rights-as-trumps approach to
the Second Amendment that narrowly focuses on history, we could
instead rightly focus on the burden on the individual and the

See supra Section I.A.
In terms of distinguishing between regulating inside and outside of the home, Justice
Kagan found that “history is replete with that distinction.” Transcript of Oral Argument, supra
note 119, at 44. Distinguishing between when individuals can protect themselves and when they
cannot also has logic in other areas of public health. For example, the state has less authority to
quarantine for HIV because people can take protective measures themselves such as abstinence
or using condoms. The state would have greater authority for a contagious disease that is airborne
and can spread between individuals prior to becoming symptomatic. Under this circumstance,
the public has less ability to protect themselves.
260 Blocher, supra note 219 (describing how concealed carry laws impact individuals who wish
to avoid firearms).
258
259

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3810404

2022]

SECOND AMENDMENT REALISM

1421

justification of the state.261 Some might look to Heller and suggest this
sounds exactly like the type of balancing that Justice Scalia rejected in
his majority opinion.262 But it is important to remember that this
assertion is neither the holding of Heller, nor is it accurate that other
constitutional rights have not been subject to balancing, as Justice Scalia
claimed.263 If we are to think of the traditional tiers of scrutiny as
balancing tests, as Justice Kavanaugh has asserted we should,264 they
have been applied for decades to some of our most protected
constitutional rights.
The emergence of the modern standards of review developed in
large part as a rejection of the Lochner-era notion that there could be
clearly delineated lines between private rights and where the
government was able to act.265 Prior, the Court viewed its responsibility
as marking conceptual boundaries as opposed to weighing competing
rights and interests, similar to how lower courts are approaching the
Second Amendment currently.266 But the Court came to realize that
most constitutional cases are conflicts between competing values,
interests, and rights, which a balancing approach recognizes and is
better equipped to handle.267
In a recent case, the Court expressly acknowledged the difficulty of
striking a proper balance between competing rights and interests, but
still maintained the constitutional requirement to do so. In Masterpiece
261 It is worth noting that Judge Barrett found that history supports this approach as well:
“Legislative power to strip the right from certain people or groups was nonetheless a historically
accepted feature of the pre-existing right that the Second Amendment protects.” Kanter v. Barr,
919 F.3d 437, 453 n.3 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting).
262 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008).
263 See id. (stating there is “no other enumerated constitutional right whose core protection
has been subjected to a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach”).
264 Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting).
265 See RICHARD H. FALLON JR., THE NATURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: THE INVENTION
AND LOGIC OF STRICT JUDICIAL SCRUTINY 16 (2019) (describing how the Lochner-style review
had become “practically and politically untenable, in part because the classical assumption that
clear, apolitical boundaries separated the sphere of governmental powers from that of private
rights had ceased to be credible”).
266 Id. at 14.
267 Id. at 18. As Professor Richard Fallon points out, the large question of balancing during its
emergence was whether it stripped the separation between the legislature and the judiciary:

If the Court was simply going to balance interests, much as the legislature presumably
had balanced interests when it enacted a challenged statute, then why should the Court
not defer to the legislative judgment about how the balance should be struck as much
in free speech cases as in those involving economic liberties?
Id. But this ultimately is what led to various degrees of balancing for certain rights, where the
Court provided added protection for those that warranted heightened scrutiny for legislative
action. Id. at 22.
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Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, the Supreme Court
considered the tension between an individual’s First Amendment rights
and a Colorado civil rights law that protected people from
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public
accommodation.268 The case was not simply an issue of the plaintiff’s
First Amendment rights and determining the scope of constitutional
protections. The Supreme Court stated quite clearly that this case
involved reconciling two competing principles: “[T]he authority of a
State and its governmental entities to protect the rights and dignity of
gay persons” and “the right of all persons to exercise fundamental
freedoms under the First Amendment.”269
The Court ultimately remanded the case for further consideration
but was clear in its direction to the lower court—a balance between the
two must be struck.270 While the plaintiff was free to exercise and
express his beliefs in private, it was the harm from exercising those
beliefs in public that the state sought to prevent.271 Here, we have
enumerated, fundamental rights—freedom of speech and free exercise
of religion—balanced against the state’s effort to protect the community
from harm that may stem from an individual exercising those rights in
the public sphere.272 To suggest that striking a similar balance for
Second Amendment rights exercised in public renders the right secondclass status ignores the manner in which other constitutional rights are
treated.273
In seeking to strike the proper balance between these competing
interests, it is necessary to examine the burden on the right as well as
what interest the government has. An individual likely will claim that
carrying firearms in public is necessary for self-defense and deterrence
and, on an individual level, produces little risk of misuse. But the
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018).
Id.
270 Id. at 1732 (“While the issues here are difficult to resolve, it must be concluded that the
State’s interest could have been weighed against Phillips’ sincere religious objections . . . .”).
271 Id. at 1725.
272 Id. at 1723.
273 “Since fundamental rights are not to be separated into first- and second-class status, the
strict scrutiny applied to the First Amendment freedom of the press and freedom of speech
should also be applied to Second Amendment rights.” Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcolm,
McDonald v. Chicago: Which Standard of Scrutiny Should Apply to Gun Control Laws?, 105 NW.
U. L. REV. 437, 455 (2011). But this assertion fails to recognize the vast array of cases applying
less than strict scrutiny to laws infringing on First Amendment speech rights, for example, when
there are incidental burdens. Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1996). Or when the law deals with commercial speech. Zauderer v.
Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980). Then there is the more deferential standard applied
to content-neutral regulations. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968).
268
269
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validity of this claim looks different from a population-based view.
When evaluating the state’s justification for regulation from this
perspective, predicting harm on an individual level becomes less
consequential and the interest in proactively preventing gun violence
from getting worse moves to the fore.
A.

The “Good Guys with Guns” Claim274

Framing the Second Amendment analysis solely in terms of an
individual right to self-defense and ignoring the real-world
consequences of broadly protecting this right presumes that
externalities are entirely irrelevant to the constitutional
consideration.275 But this approach is difficult to justify once you
consider even Heller’s proclamation that the Amendment does not
afford protections to “dangerous and unusual weapons.”276 As
Professors Joseph Blocher and Darrell Miller accurately point out, “To
say something is unreasonably dangerous is to suggest that the costs of
bearing it outweigh the benefits.”277 For example, while a machine gun
may be useful for self-defense, it does not receive Second Amendment
protection. Thus, even Heller is implicitly taking practical
considerations into account.
Therefore, practical considerations and empirical evidence must
be taken into account when assessing the claim that good guys with
guns are an acceptable, even desired, way to counter bad guys with guns.
The law-abiding citizen argument relies on the common refrain used by
proponents of gun rights: “[G]uns don’t kill people; people kill

274 In response to the Newtown shooting, the CEO of the National Rifle Association, Wayne
LaPierre, stated that “[t]he only thing that stops a bad guy with a gun, is a good guy with a gun.”
Peter Overby, NRA: “Only Thing that Stops a Bad Guy with a Gun Is a Good Guy with a Gun,”
NPR (Dec. 21, 2012, 3:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/2012/12/21/167824766/nra-only-thing-thatstops-a-bad-guy-with-a-gun-is-a-good-guy-with-a-gun [https://perma.cc/ESA2-68N5].
275 Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, Lethality, Public Carry, and Adequate Alternatives,
53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 279, 296 (2016). They compare this to free speech, which cannot be limited
simply because it is or may be construed as offensive. Id. However, there are other areas of free
speech where the harm or potential harm, as opposed to simply offensiveness, is constitutionally
relevant. Simple examples include fighting words and real threats, which receive no protection.
But commercial speech receives less First Amendment protection at least in part because of the
harm that may come to the public. See, e.g., Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (allowing broader
government regulation to prevent commercial harms).
276 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008).
277 Blocher & Miller, supra note 275, at 297.
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people.”278 But this personal-responsibility framing belies the inherent
danger of firearms and the data that suggests firearms are more likely
to increase danger and harm than to deter or minimize it.279 To be sure,
as the D.C. Circuit noted in Wrenn, confrontations occur outside the
home.280 But to suggest that this unequivocally supports a broad right
to carry firearms in public is, again, only looking at it from an individual
standpoint. Whether an increase in public carry would in fact make
confrontations more likely and more deadly should be a consideration
as well.
Evidence shows us that the presence of firearms can escalate
common occurrences into confrontations with deadly consequences. In
some circumstances, the presence of the gun itself can provoke a
potentially harmful confrontation. For example, as more states pass
shall-issue laws, and more people carry firearms, there is evidence that
road rage incidents are rising.281 Specifically, research suggests those
with guns in their vehicles are more likely to engage in road rage
incidents.282 This research also indicates that individuals carrying guns
may act more aggressively or, equally problematic, that aggressive
individuals are more likely to carry firearms.283 The tragic shooting of
Trayvon Martin by George Zimmerman, a permit holder, is a highprofile example of an individual who may have been emboldened to
lethal action because he carried a firearm.284
For another example, in 2012, a concealed carry permit holder in
Pennsylvania was asked to leave a bar. He became angry, argued, and
shot two men, killing one, before another concealed carry permit holder
ultimately subdued him.285 Both were law-abiding citizens until one
shot two men in anger, and the other shot that individual to protect
themselves and the other bar patrons. What we see here is that people
who would have fallen into the “good guys with guns” category can shift
to the “bad guys with guns” category quickly and with deadly results.
We know these incidents will happen and the question is whether states
are empowered to take proactive measures to reduce gun violence by
limiting the number of firearms in public spaces. These examples
278 See James Downie, Opinion, The NRA Is Winning the Spin Battle, WASH. POST (Feb. 20,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2018/02/20/the-nra-iswinning-the-spin-battle [https://perma.cc/J2ZU-NSWB].
279 See infra notes 304–15 and accompanying text.
280 See Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
281 Donohue, Aneja & Weber, supra note 11, at 204.
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 Id. at 205. This is not to suggest that race did not play a factor in the attack, but simply to
focus on the fact that the presence of the firearm is what made the confrontation lethal.
285 Id. at 201.
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demonstrate how the presence of firearms can escalate confrontations
as opposed to deterring them.
This potential for escalating violence translates to criminals as well.
In a survey of convicted criminals conducted for Wright and Rossi’s
Armed and Dangerous, there is significant evidence that broader public
carry of firearms is ineffective in deterring crime and may in fact
exacerbate the harm that occurs.286 The primary justifications for
carrying a firearm cited by those surveyed were the related motives of
efficiency and a reduced need to hurt those who were targeted.287 What
the survey intimates is that criminals using firearms hoped the presence
of a gun would make the victim acquiesce so the objective could be
completed as quickly as possible. According to those surveyed, having
a firearm makes a victim less likely to draw out the process.288
Contrary to the argument that more guns will reduce crime,
criminals stated that the chance a victim would be armed was a
significant factor in their decision to acquire and carry a firearm.289 In
addition to efficiency considerations, self-preservation was a strong
motivator in a criminal’s decision to carry a firearm.290 The presence of
a firearm on a potential victim complicates both efficiency and selfpreservation and more likely serves to incentivize rather than
discourage criminals from carrying firearms.291 The chance that a
potential victim would be armed was an important factor for a majority
of criminals who were armed themselves.292 In fact, this was a much
more important reason than the fact that police have firearms.293
This data reveals that the manner in which self-defense is
contemplated in Second Amendment analyses is incomplete. While
some may find it loathsome to do so, if Second Amendment
constitutionality is to weigh the impact on crime, it is vital that the
motivations and behavior of criminals be more accurately considered.
We often think of self-defense for the “law-abiding citizen,” but it is
undoubtedly an important concern of those who commit crimes as well.
And social determinants help to reveal why increased firearms in
the hands of the public lacks a significant deterrent effect. Part of the
persuasiveness of an individual using self-defense to challenge a firearm

JAMES D. WRIGHT & PETER H. ROSSI, ARMED AND CONSIDERED DANGEROUS (2d ed. 2008).
Id. at 129–31.
288 Id. at 129 (“[I]f you carry a gun your victim doesn’t put up a fight, and that way you don’t
have to hurt them.”).
289 Id. at 141.
290 Id. at 131.
291 Id. at 150.
292 Id.
293 Id.
286
287
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restriction, and public carry restrictions in particular, is the theoretical
assumption that people are rational actors; law-abiding citizens will
remain law-abiding, and criminals are those who only act with criminal
intent. But in reality, many considerations influence people’s behavior.
Extreme poverty created by inequitable wealth distribution, poor
public education, substandard housing, lack of jobs with livable wages,
living in communities plagued with violence, and substance use
disorders are some of the key factors that can drive people to commit
crimes.294 The survey of those convicted of gun crimes—much more
informative than relying on the theoretical criminal mind—supports
the social-determinants view that broad public carry laws are unlikely
to deter criminal activity. Those surveyed by Wright and Rossi resemble
the state prison population: “[P]redominantly young, poorly educated,
and disproportionately nonwhite.”295 They grew up around guns, using
them most of their lives.296 On average, the surveyed population first
fired a gun at thirteen years of age.297
With many of these people living in dangerous environments likely
plagued by violence, the habit of carrying a firearm for personal
protection becomes routine and about self-preservation rather than for
the purpose of committing a crime. Wright and Rossi state that “it is
misleading to look at strictly criminal behaviors as divorced from the
broader day-to-day style of life that characterizes the criminal
population.”298 Nearly thirty percent of those surveyed said they carried
weapons all of the time, with fear being a significant reason for doing
so.299 This leads to opportunistic criminal attempts, which are less likely
to be influenced by a broad Second Amendment protection for public
carry: “[M]any of the men in our sample were not calculating, ‘rational’
criminals but rather strict opportunists whose ‘strategic choice,’ when
they made one, was to commit some crime that was suddenly there for
them to commit.”300
The “more guns, less crime” theory assumes that the criminal who
knows that more individuals are carrying firearms in public will choose
not to commit crimes out of fear for their safety and well-being.301 But
294 See, e.g., Daniel Kim, Social Determinants of Health in Relation to Firearm-Related
Homicides in the United States: A Nationwide Multilevel Cross-Sectional Study, 16 PLOS MED. 1
(2019).
295 WRIGHT & ROSSI, supra note 286, at 12.
296 Id.
297 Id.
298 Id. at 126–27.
299 Id. at 126.
300 Id. at 127. Only thirty percent of those surveyed acquired a firearm specifically to use in
committing a crime. Id. at 126.
301 Id. at 127.
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recognizing the influence social determinants have on criminal
behavior makes it difficult to accept this logic.302 If anything, the
evidence intimates that a rise in armed civilians may only stand to
increase the likelihood that criminals are armed. Taken together,
criminal behavior and the social determinants indicate the likelihood of
a result contrary to the intended outcome often cited by proponents of
broad public carry rights. An increase in armed civilians is unlikely to
deter criminal activity. Therefore, while there may be other
justifications for a broad right to public carry, an understanding of
social determinants suggests deterrence is not one.
But the fact that public carry is unlikely to deter criminal behavior
and could potentially even incentivize those with criminal intent to
carry firearms could still be used to argue for broader carry laws.
However, the use of a gun to successfully stop a crime is an exceedingly
rare occurrence.303 Assailants injured those who used a firearm in selfdefense at the same rate as those who took other protective actions, such
as running away, screaming, arguing, struggling, cooperating, or trying
to attract attention.304 One study even found that being armed during
an assault was associated with an increased risk of being shot, which
tracks with the survey data of criminals and their priority of selfpreservation.305
Even those who are indeed law abiding and aim to help may
contribute more to morbidity and mortality than they do to safety.306
The potential for misfiring and hitting innocent bystanders, especially
in public spaces, is a serious risk. In one shooting analysis, police
officers, who have undergone extensive training, were accurate only
18% of the time.307 And even police officers, who presumably would be

Kim, supra note 294.
See, e.g., Donohue, Aneja & Weber, supra note 11, at 202 (“A five-year study of such violent
victimizations in the United States found that victims reported failing to defend or to threaten
the criminal with a gun 99.2 percent of the time . . . .”).
304 David Hemenway & Sara J. Solnick, The Epidemiology of Self-Defense Gun Use: Evidence
from the National Crime Victimization Surveys 2007–2011, 79 PREVENTIVE MED. 22, 25 (2015).
305 Charles C. Branas, Therese S. Richmond, Dennis P. Culhane, Thomas R. Ten Have &
Douglas J. Wiebe, Investigating the Link Between Gun Possession and Gun Assault, 99 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 2034, 2037 (2009).
306 Philip J. Cook & John J. Donohue, Saving Lives by Regulating Guns: Evidence for Policy,
358 SCIENCE 1259, 1260–61 (2017) (“There are documented cases in which well-intentioned
actions of private individuals with guns ended with the death of an innocent person.”).
307 BERNARD D. ROSTKER ET AL., EVALUATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
FIREARM TRAINING AND FIREARM-DISCHARGE REVIEW PROCESS
14
(2008),
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG717.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9SK3-S5VT].
302
303
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more effective than an untrained permit holder, struggle to subdue
active shooters.308
Yet, many Americans tend to overestimate their ability to use their
firearms and underestimate their misuse.309 In a survey of nearly five
thousand people, 82.6% said they were less likely than the average
person to use their gun in anger.310 In that same survey, 50% believed
they were in the top 10% of those able to own a handgun responsibly,
and 23% thought they were in the top 1%.311 Research shows that
overconfidence increases risk-taking, leading to more individuals
attempting to use their firearms when it may not be warranted or safe.312
And a plainclothes individual also puts themselves at risk of being
misidentified by police on the scene as the active shooter.313 These
complications raise doubts about the efficacy of the law-abiding citizen
to increase individual or public safety.
These complications do not begin to contemplate the critically
important issue of implicit bias, which causes havoc for persons of
color, who already suffer disproportionately from gun violence.314 We
have seen the manner in which law enforcement overact with firearms
toward people of color, despite their training.315 A shift toward
privatized lethal enforcement of the law—a consequence that seems
likely but is not nearly discussed as much as self-defense—could have
particularly devastating consequences for communities of color.316
In moving from the theoretical to reality, we see an altered version
of burden when considering the most prevalent arguments for an

308 Donohue, Aneja & Weber, supra note 11, at 206. In an FBI study, in nearly half the
instances where “police engaged the shooter to end the threat, law enforcement suffered
casualties.” Id. That same study only found one incident where a private armed citizen, other
than an armed security guard, was successful in stopping a shooter, but that one individual was
an active-duty marine. Id.
309 Id. at 203.
310 Id.
311 Id.
312 Id.
313 Id. at 212.
314 Benforado, supra note 207, at 8–10 (linking biases against minorities and the Second
Amendment).
315 See Cheryl W. Thompson, Fatal Police Shootings of Unarmed Black People Reveal
Troubling Patterns, NPR (Jan. 25, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/01/25/956177021/
fatal-police-shootings-of-unarmed-black-people-reveal-troubling-patterns [https://perma.cc/
U6VD-XPHP].
316 The shooting of Ahmaud Arbery provides a tragic example. Though the killers were
convicted of murder, the men who tracked and shot Mr. Arbery still attempted to justify their
actions as crime prevention. Tariro Mzezewa, The Defense Cites a Citizen’s Arrest Law that Has
Been Largely Repealed, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/05/us/
citizens-arrest-law-arbery-murder-trial.html [https://perma.cc/5LGK-7FP5].
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unencumbered right to carry firearms in public. The paradigmatic
“good guys versus bad guys” framing begins to lose its persuasiveness
as the line between the two becomes more blurred.317 Meanwhile, both
deterrence and self-defense become much weaker when social
determinants are incorporated. If true consideration were paid to the
interests on both sides, these factors would leave proponents of a broad
right to public carry with an uphill battle to counter evidence the state
might produce demonstrating that restricting public carry may mitigate
gun violence and protect the public’s health, safety, and freedoms.
B.

Protecting the Rights of All

After assessing the strongest arguments for a broad right to public
carry, it is important to evaluate state justification for burdening that
right. A vague mention of public safety creates a hollowed-out
counterpoint to an individual’s right to a firearm. As a result, the risk of
harm at issue becomes abstract and easily ignored, and attention shifts
to the more personalized, concrete claims from individual challengers
claiming needs for a firearm. But this misunderstands both risk and
harm, which are more accurately portrayed at the population level, and
the state’s interest in minimizing them. Absent scrutiny of the state’s
real interest, the courts ignore the real-world implications of their
decisions. Public health research, with its population-based view,
provides a useful resource here. The most recent research suggests that
legal regimes making it easier for individuals to carry firearms in public
are more likely to increase gun violence than protect the public.318 Shallissue concealed carry permit laws, for example, have been associated
with higher rates of firearm-related homicide and handgun-specific
homicide when compared with states that had the stricter may-issue
permit laws.319 As the authors of one study put it, the “finding that the
association between shall-issue laws and homicide rates is specific to
handgun homicides adds plausibility to the observed relationship.”320

317 See Susan B. Sorenson & David Hemenway, Beyond the Good Guy Versus Bad Guy
Worldview, in SOC. POL’Y AND SOC. JUST. 112 (John L. Jackson Jr. ed., 2017) (describing the limits
of this type of dichotomous thinking in the gun debate).
318 Siegel et al., supra note 31, at 1928.
319 Id.; see also Michael Siegel, Molly Pahn, Ziming Xuan, Eric Fleegler & David Hemenway,
The Impact of State Firearm Laws on Homicide and Suicide Deaths in the USA, 1991–2016: A
Panel Study, 34 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 2021 (2019) (finding shall-issue laws associated with a
significant increase in the homicide rate).
320 Siegel et al., supra note 31, at 1928.
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The adoption of shall-issue laws is also associated with a persistent,
long-term increase in handgun sales.321 This is troublesome given that
the corresponding increase in handgun-specific homicides showed the
largest effect under shall-issue regimes.322 A narrower example of the
impact on homicide is that shall-issue laws are associated with a
significantly greater risk of firearm workplace homicides.323
Conversely, there is data supporting the association between mayissue laws and lower firearm homicide rates, specifically in large
cities.324 One study shows differing effects on laws in urban versus
suburban and rural areas, which may suggest the state could justify
different laws for different regions in the state.325 The data related to
each type of public carry regime lends credence to the fact that the law
can indeed impact gun violence. Specifically, this supports the
suggestion that limiting firearms in public and the number of people
who are able to carry them can reduce the harm to the community.
The theoretical underpinning of the “more guns, less crime”
argument was questioned above, and research increasingly supports
that doubt. Early on, there was at least some inconsistency regarding a
correlation between lax regimes for public carry and increased gun
violence.326 Yet, as time has passed, more states enacted permissive
firearm carry laws, datasets have grown, and statistical methodologies
have become more sophisticated.327 Consequently, the research has
become more robust. The changes in state laws make it easier for
researchers to study the impact public carry laws—or lack thereof—can
have on gun violence. Current evidence strongly supports the
proposition that regulations making it easier to carry firearms outside
of the home are more likely to increase, rather than decrease, harm to
the public.328
Id.
Id.
323 Mitchell L. Doucette, Cassandra K. Crifasi & Shannon Frattaroli, Right-to-Carry Laws and
Firearm Workplace Homicides: A Longitudinal Analysis (1992–2017), 109 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1747, 1751 (2019) (citing a twenty-nine-percent increase in these incidents). States that passed
shall-issue laws from 1992 to 2017 averaged a twenty-four-percent increase in firearm workplace
homicides after the law was implemented. Id.
324 Siegel et al., supra note 183, at 262.
325 See id. The specificity of the impact in the study for may-issue carry laws indicates that a
more localized effort could be an appropriate manner in which to balance between state and local
laws. See generally Blocher, Firearm Localism, supra note 10.
326 Siegel, Pahn, Xuan, Fleegler & Hemenway, supra note 319, at 2026 (“[H]istorically the
literature on the impact of concealed carry–permitting laws has been inconsistent and several
studies have found an association between ‘shall issue’ laws and reduced murder rates . . . .”).
327 Donohue, Aneja & Weber, supra note 11, at 199.
328 Siegel, Pahn, Xuan, Fleegler & Hemenway, supra note 319, at 2026 (“[T]he three most
recent studies to examine [shall-issue] laws found a positive association with homicide rates.”).
321
322
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A study led by John Donohue used both panel data and synthetic
control estimates to examine whether there was any contradiction in
the results based on methodology.329 According to Donohue and his
coauthors, their findings “uniformly undermine the ‘More Guns, Less
Crime’ hypothesis.”330 Focusing on crime more broadly—as opposed to
homicide specifically—their research finds a substantial increase in
violent crime in the ten years after a state adopts shall-issue laws.331 In
support of the association between the two, the authors cite the
observed increase in the percentage of robberies committed with a
firearm, while having no association with limiting the overall number
of robberies.332 The authors believe the results are likely biased in a
downward manner because their study does not account for the impact
these laws have on increasing firearms in public spaces that are
subsequently stolen and then used in other states that do not have mayissue laws in place.333
This data does not mean that the definitive cause of violent crime
or homicides is shall-issue laws. An association between these laws and
increases in violence does not equate to causation.334 But the research
does suggest that elected representatives endeavoring to minimize or
prevent gun violence have at least a substantial empirical base to
support stricter public carry laws. This typically results in judicial
deference to the legislature, which must answer to the electorate.
Given the data described, a broad right to public carry could
generate a proliferation of firearms and gun violence in public spaces.
A brief summary linking key data points already discussed may be of
use. Shall-issue states are associated with a long-term increase in
handgun sales.335 The presence of firearms can increase the likelihood
that someone becomes emboldened to act more aggressively, either in
anger or in defense of themselves or others.336 Meanwhile, people tend
to overestimate their skills with a firearm and underestimate their
likelihood of misuse, which increases risk-taking behavior.337 More
armed civilians are unlikely to deter criminal behavior and may increase

See Donohue, Aneja & Weber, supra note 11, at 199.
Id. at 240. The authors go on to say that “[t]here is not even the slightest hint in the data
from any econometrically sound regression that RTC laws reduce violent crime.” Id.
331 Id.
332 Id.
333 Id. at 217–18.
334 A detailed discussion of association versus causation is beyond the scope of this Article.
335 Siegel et al., supra note 31, at 1928.
336 Donohue, Aneja & Weber, supra note 11, at 205.
337 Id. at 203–04.
329
330
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the number of those with criminal intent to both carry and use their
own firearms.338
What this describes is a potential arms race that is much more
likely to exacerbate and increase gun violence than it is to minimize the
epidemic. As more civilians and criminals arm themselves, this will only
lead to more individuals of both groups—as flawed as this binary may
be—to continue to feel the need to carry guns. What we see here is a
snowball effect where the proliferation of firearms results in the need to
acquire more firearms.
Empirics support the propensity for firearms and gun violence to
spread. One of the more interesting areas of emerging research is how
gun violence and contagious diseases can propagate in a similar
manner.339 The two are comparable because just as exposure to a
contagious pathogen makes a person more likely to become infected,
exposure to firearms and gun violence makes someone more likely to
become a victim of gun violence.340 This is not to insinuate that gun
violence actually spreads biologically exactly like a virus. But it does
imply that exposure to firearms and gun violence can increase the
chance that someone will experience gun violence themselves. And
given that the research data indicates that broad rights to public carry
seem nearly certain to increase exposure to gun violence, the spread
could escalate. Perhaps more importantly, this data also supports the
assertion that gun violence is far from random and sporadic. Thus,
research supports the idea that gun violence is more likely to respond
to preventive regulatory measures.
The data may also demonstrate how gun culture can spread and
contribute to the growth in gun violence. Social contagion is about
culture and behavior, not biology.341 Social contagion explains
behavioral patterns in groups of people that may seem counterintuitive
to the average person. For firearms, cultural norms can perpetuate
violence through inflated ideas of individual rights, honor, and
freedom, while disrespecting others’ rights, well-being, and lives.342 A
WRIGHT & ROSSI, supra note 286, at 141.
See Charles C. Branas, Sara Jacoby & Elena Andreyeva, Firearm Violence as a Disease—
“Hot People” or “Hot Spots”?, 177 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 333, 333 (2017).
340 Andrew V. Papachristos, Christopher Wildeman & Elizabeth Roberto, Tragic, but Not
Random: The Social Contagion of Nonfatal Gunshot Injuries, 125 SOC. SCI. & MED. 139, 147
(2015).
341 However, some studies “suggest that the diffusion of gun violence might occur through
person-to-person interactions, in a process akin to the epidemiological transmission of a bloodborne pathogen.” Ben Green, Thibaut Horel & Andrew V. Papachristos, Modeling Contagion
Through Social Networks to Explain and Predict Gunshot Violence in Chicago, 2006 to 2014, 177
JAMA INTERNAL MED. 326, 327 (2017).
342 See Donohue, Aneja & Weber, supra note 11, at 209.
338
339
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rights-as-trumps approach to the Second Amendment only stands to
intensify this problem.343
Such cultural norms and peer pressure may help to explain why we
cannot simply rely on law-abiding citizens to remain law abiding and
peaceful. A broad right to public carry reinforces conceptions of
violence as a legitimate means of self-protection and the idea that
individuals can and should be responsible for their self-defense.344 A
spread of pro-gun culture in tandem with broader Second Amendment
rights could also contribute significantly to issues of toxic masculinity,
as well as perpetuate the inequitable division between populations
whose guns rights are protected and communities who bear the brunt
of gun violence.345
If we take seriously the relevant interests on both sides of the
constitutional equation—the individual’s interest in self-defense and
the state’s interest in protecting the public—then this data is indeed
constitutionally salient.346 While the Second Amendment’s underlying
values remain unclear, safety appears to be a strong consideration, both
individual and societal.347 Simply put, the empirical research available
currently suggests that a proliferation of firearms in the hands of private
citizens in public spaces is unlikely to further either of those interests.
With that in mind, an unfettered right to carry in public for any and all
who want it seems like an unnecessarily broad and dangerous
proposition that ignores the state’s interest in protecting the public.

343 See Greene, supra note 21, at 37 (comparing the rights-as-trumps frame to an approach
that enables partisans to recognize the rights and interests on both sides).
344 LIGHT, supra note 146, at 58 (describing how changes in self-defense law enabled, if not
endorsed, the use of violence outside of the home).
345 See generally Mary Anne Franks, Men, Women, and Optimal Violence, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV.
929; C.D. Christensen, The “True Man” and His Gun: On the Masculine Mystique of Second
Amendment Jurisprudence, 23 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 477 (2017). Take, for example, the
tragic murder of Philando Castile, a Black man who had a permit to carry a gun and announced
this fact to the officer, before the officer shot and killed him. See Mitch Smith, Video of Police
Killing of Philando Castile Is Publicly Released, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/20/us/police-shooting-castile-trial-video.html
[https://perma.cc/B6QR-4933].
346 Siegel & Blocher, supra note 18, at 15.
347 Even the approach of a rigid scope at the founding must acknowledge the importance of
safety. Any exclusion of actors from the right, such as felons and the mentally ill, would
presumably have been due to danger. “Scope justifications rest on a conclusion that some past
authorities responsible for the scope of the constitutional provision . . . view certain people as
untrustworthy (presumably because they are dangerous).” Volokh, supra note 226, at 1497.
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Good Cause for Proactive State Action

The primary goal of this Article is not to answer definitively the
scope of the Second Amendment or whether there is a historical right
to concealed or open carry. The aim is to shift the focus from the
unending search for Second Amendment certainty, to suggest that an
attempt to find such certitude—especially with regard to an
impenetrable scope for the right—may ultimately further the division
and increase the improbability of finding a balance between respecting
the Second Amendment and protecting the public.348 Instead, this
Article implores a balanced approach to this contentious area, where
the judiciary and broader legal academy may help to lead the public to
see the issue as one with valid concerns and considerations on both
sides. This methodology has not only the benefit of respecting both
interests, but it also grounds the analysis in reality. Rather than
narrowly examining only a theoretical need for self-defense, a balanced
consideration that takes into account the state’s justification for limiting
the right respects and appreciates the lived realities of those suffering
from gun violence. And, indeed, by reframing the analysis as
contemplating both the individual’s Second Amendment right and the
state’s interest in protecting the public—incorporating within that
consideration the rights and liberties of the public—the constitutional
evaluation looks considerably different.
The incorporation of empirical data, too, is not meant to imply that
it definitively answers all questions. To be sure, empirical research on
the law’s impact on gun violence, health disparities, social determinants
of health, and the difficulty of successful firearm self-defense does not
answer all Second Amendment questions plaguing the legal academy.
But the data does suggest that some areas that garner much of the focus
are not necessarily critical to Second Amendment constitutional
analysis—or at least not as critical as courts currently consider them.
The data also provides a way to inform a controversial debate. And,
perhaps most important, data offers a path for flexibility.

348 As Professor Greene convincingly states, when the “contours of that right are treated as
predetermined by text, structure, history, and precedent, its contact with the imperatives of
modern life [are] artificially severed.” Greene, supra note 21, at 78. This renders irrelevant “the
particulars of the government’s behavior, the acts it passes, the players’ motivations, the evidence
the legislature or agencies gather, or the policy objectives they pursue, and more about the
abstracted right the government is alleged to have violated.” Id. This approach places the entirety
of the power to determine the course of action with the judiciary, leaving the people and their
elected officials on the sideline, with no avenue for action other than to scream ceaselessly that
the other side is at best mistaken, and at worst unconcerned about rights.
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Reliance on strict categories often loses its luster over time.
Inevitable challenges to the rigidity result in categorical exceptions to
the categorical rules.349 Even categorical approaches incorporate
balancing on the front or back end, with balancing better able to handle
quarrels in a pluralistic society.350 Regardless, it seems likely that both
will play a role over the long course of the Second Amendment’s
development.351 And an empirically informed development allows for
transparency and an accurate depiction of the state’s justification, which
could even diminish over time.352
While the constitutional fate of good cause restrictions is in doubt,
it must be said that they are, at the very least, an attempt to respect both
the right to self-defense and protect the rights and liberties of the entire
community.353 Recognition of both interests suggests a balanced
approach—as this Article has supported—which intermediate scrutiny
bests represents. Though the Bruen oral argument indicates the
decision will likely focus on history, this fails to appropriately
acknowledge the realities of our time and the state’s authority to tackle
the current threat of gun violence in contemporary terms. A detailed
analysis under the intermediate scrutiny framework—one that grants
respect to interests on both sides and demands an examination of
modern empirics to more skillfully calculate the burdens to the right
and the benefits to the public—would better reflect the Court’s modern
constitutional jurisprudence and the serious tension that lies with
evaluating gun legislation.

349 See Blocher, supra note 7, at 434–35 (discussing the exceptions in Fourth Amendment
categoricalism arising from the social cost of suppressing evidence).
350 Id. at 388–89.
351 Id. at 413 (“Second Amendment doctrine will eventually become, like First Amendment
doctrine, a patchwork of balancing and categorical tests.”).
352 Wiley & Vladeck, supra note 214, at 188–89.
353 At the Bruen oral argument, the suggestion was made that a location-based sensitive-places
restriction would be a more appropriate regulation, especially given Heller’s presumptively lawful
label of such restrictions. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 119, at 25–26. While a
discussion of the location-based restriction on public carry is beyond the scope of this Article,
the attempts to detail the boundaries of such a restriction during the oral argument make clear
the difficulty of relying on this method to satisfy concerns of individual self-defense and
protecting the public. For example, Paul Clement, arguing for the petitioners, suggested
determining whether “weapons are out of place” in a given location, though it is difficult to
understand who would make such a subjective determination and what guidelines they would
use. Id. at 27. As Solicitor General Underwood pointed out in her argument for New York, it
would be difficult to determine a rule that appropriately considers the wide range of spaces and
the evolving threats within each that appropriately takes into account the changing needs for selfdefense and public safety. Id. at 81. As she then stated, “[T]hat’s one of the things that I think is
hard about the suggestion that a sensitive place regime could replace a [good-cause] system like
this.” Id. at 81–82.
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Even if carrying a firearm in public were at the core of Second
Amendment protections and strict scrutiny analysis were determined
to be the applicable standard of review—which also seems unlikely—
there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that balanced gun safety
measures, such as good cause restrictions, can satisfy this test as well.
Strict scrutiny requires a compelling state interest, and the state must
narrowly tailor its action to further that interest.354 While most, if not
all, courts would recognize reducing gun violence as a compelling state
interest, it is important to keep in mind the broad scope of the harm
caused by gun violence.
To simply state that gun violence is a problem, or that public health
and safety are worthy goals, is to downplay the true threat that gun
violence poses in this country. The harm goes far beyond the alreadytragic deaths and nonfatal injuries sustained each year. But the harm is
indeed preventable. Accepting a public health perspective—with its
focus on upstream preventive measures to minimize risk—in Second
Amendment jurisprudence will ensure that the state is not limited to
merely reactive, criminal measures that are not working. Courts must
allow a state to take some proactive, preventive measures.355
As previously mentioned, a decision that the Second Amendment
ensures nearly everyone has the right to carry a firearm in public has
the potential to exacerbate an already-growing public health crisis. As
more individuals decide to purchase and carry firearms, others may be
fearful for their own safety and do the same. This could include those
who commit crimes. The increased violence that shall-issue laws are
associated with may continue a snowball effect with more individuals
taking up arms in response to others increasingly carrying firearms in
public. The proliferation of public armament can escalate any
confrontation and put innocent bystanders at risk.
This is not a thought experiment. Not only does research suggest
these are likely outcomes, but we have seen similar circumstances
before. Many often attribute the increased gun violence in the 1980s and
1990s to the crack epidemic, but more recent analysis suggests that
flooding the market with cheap guns may be a better explanation of the
changes in gun violence.356 This position is supported by the fact that
the increased murder rate for young Black males has continued despite

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 688 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905).
356 William N. Evans, Craig Garthwaite & Timothy J. Moore, Guns and Violence: The
Enduring Impact of Crack Cocaine Markets on Young Black Males 24 n.21 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Rsch., Working Paper No. 24819, 2018).
354
355
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the crack epidemic abating.357 And given that shall-issue laws are
associated with a long-term increase in handgun sales, these laws may
incentivize distributors to flood the market again with affordable
handguns.358
Incidents of gun violence are not distributed equitably throughout
the country. Data from the crack epidemic illustrates how a
proliferation of firearms has the potential to increase gun violence and
target communities of color who already suffer disproportionately.
Young Black males face firearm homicide rates ten times higher than
young white males.359 The disparate impact for youth helps explain why
life expectancy for Black males is five years lower than white males, with
firearm homicide accounting for 14.5% of the life years lost before age
65 for Black males and only 1.2% of the life years lost for white males.360
And if violence were indeed to increase, there would almost certainly
be a response to increase policing efforts, which would likely target lowsocioeconomic settings and communities of color. The already strained
relationship between law enforcement and these communities would
suffer further tension, decreasing trust and safety and increasing harm
and health disparities.
As we attempt to move forward in society with gun safety and in
the legal academy with Second Amendment doctrine, it is essential that
we keep these facts in mind. For good cause laws, for example, the
question would then be whether the state narrowly tailors their
restriction to both prevent a rise in gun violence and health disparities,
as well as to mitigate harm. There is evidence that may-issue laws are
associated with a reduction in gun violence and that the alternative
shall-issue laws are associated with increased gun violence.361 Given the
data, it is difficult to determine a narrower measure that would properly
balance the rights of those who seek to carry firearms for self-defense
and the rights of those who wish to avoid firearms.362 The state would
be able to minimize the number of firearms in public, while allowing
those who have a specific need for self-defense measures to arm
themselves in public spaces.
357 Id. at 4 (finding murder rates for young Black males are seventy percent higher than if they
had followed historic trends).
358 Siegel et al., supra note 31, at 1928.
359 Green, Horel & Papachristos, supra note 341, at 327.
360 Fowler, Dahlberg, Haileyesus & Annest, supra note 253, at 10.
361 Siegel et al., supra note 31, at 1928. Discussion of shall-issue laws in relation to the potential
to increase gun violence inherently suggests a risk that no licensing law for public carry, which is
even less restrictive, would have a similar directional effect, if not greater in magnitude.
362 For good cause restrictions specifically, “if the history warrants taking local conditions and
local population density and so forth into account, it’s hard to think of another way
to . . . effectively do that.” Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 119, at 77.
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This does not mean that the specifications of a good cause law
cannot be challenged. Some definitions of a good cause may be too
narrow, or the statute may lack due process requirements.363 Or a
facially valid law may operate unconstitutionally in practice by denying
a permit to everyone who applies.364 But what should be important as
an initial matter is that good cause laws aim to minimize firearms in
public by narrowing the permissibility only to those who can
demonstrate a real need.
Gun violence is a complex public health problem that involves
many factors. There is no silver bullet. Therefore, courts should not
hold states to a standard of definitive proof for success of any specific
statute. This is especially true in an area where research is constantly
evolving. Typically, this would indicate the importance of deference to
the legislature, which is better equipped to respond to new findings and
accountable to the public, as opposed to having the courts “make the
choice for the legislature.”365
Gun rights proponents may decry such an assessment. But this
type of analysis does not require legislators to disregard self-defense.
Nor does this analysis suggest that the right to self-defense in public is
less important than the right to self-defense in the home. Instead, it
merely indicates that the factors to be considered come out differently
in the public setting. The average individual’s safety in public is not
dependent solely on their ability to protect themselves through lethal
force. In public, there are law enforcement and safety officers and the
“watchful eyes” of other citizens.366 Public spaces also increasingly
feature other safety features, such as physical barriers, metal detectors,
and video cameras. These factors are relevant to constitutional
consideration of public carry restrictions as well. To reduce the analysis
to a binary of self-defense or helpless vulnerability is a false dichotomy.
Moreover, the risk to others is inarguably greater in a public setting
than in the home. An individual may increase their risk of harm by
entering the home of someone who owns a firearm. At the very least,
they have some control over their level of risk in that circumstance. But
363 Guidance can be found in public health law with quarantine regulations, which are an
extreme and proactive limitation on fundamental rights. Quarantine, which has been upheld as
constitutional, involves holding an individual involuntarily because they are suspected of having
a contagious disease. LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT
428–29 (rev. & expanded 2d ed. 2008). This is distinguishable from isolation, which is when an
individual is known to be infected. Id. Though this has been upheld, there are certain due process
requirements that are necessary to ensure constitutionality. See Michael R. Ulrich & Wendy K.
Mariner, Quarantine and the Federal Role in Epidemics, 71 SMU L. REV. 391, 403–12 (2018).
364 See, e.g., Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1070 (9th Cir. 2018).
365 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 119, at 20.
366 Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 671 (1st Cir. 2018).
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a proliferation of firearms carried in public would place many at
increased risk with little they can do to protect themselves, other than
being forced to limit their time in public.
Gun control proponents may also be unhappy with this policy
option. The absolute limitation of firearms in public would perhaps be
preferable, and, almost certainly, more effective in accomplishing the
state’s goals. But a flat prohibition of ready-to-use firearms in public
would not survive an intermediate or strict scrutiny analysis, let alone
survive Heller’s dismissal of general bans.367 Moreover, it would not
fully respect the self-defense right that Heller declared anchors the
Second Amendment right.
A search for balance in a pluralistic society should mean that each
side of a debate rarely gets everything it asks for. Second Amendment
jurisprudence should reflect this principle. As we have seen with the
First Amendment’s fight between categorical protections and balancing
tests, the doctrine evolved into one primarily of balancing. With more
Second Amendment cases likely to come before the Court in the near
future, there is no need to delay the inevitable. A continued search
through history will not create consensus, and decisions based on
centuries-old documents are unlikely to provide the public with an
understanding of the Court’s rationale, nor are they likely to engender
trust in their ability to protect the rights of everyone. Thus, this Article
is not an endorsement of the “living Constitution,” but it is concerned
with those who live under the Constitution, and how constitutional
determinations can and do impact their health and safety.
CONCLUSION
A continued reliance on law-abiding citizens to continuously abide
by the law ignores the stark reality of what is taking place in this
country. When Amnesty International is issuing warnings about the
risk of traveling to the United States due to gun violence—and
specifically stating that those who do visit the country should avoid
public spaces where the risk is greater—we should recognize that there
is a problem that needs to be addressed.368 Public health teaches us that

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635–36 (2008).
See Travel Advisory: United States of America, AMNESTY INT’L (Aug. 7, 2019),
https://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/government-relations/advocacy/travel-advisory-unitedstates-of-america [https://perma.cc/2SC3-LY8X] (suggesting those visiting the United States
“[a]void places where large numbers of people gather”); Global Human Rights Movement Issues
Travel Warning for the U.S. Due to Rampant Gun Violence, AMNESTY INT’L (Aug. 7, 2019),
367
368
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we cannot rely on individuals to simply improve their behavior and
minimize all risks to themselves or others. Research has demonstrated
that “changing the environmental context within which health
problems occur is essential and at times may be more effective than
focusing only on individuals.”369 This applies as much to gun violence
as any other public health or safety problem.
May-issue, “good cause,” requirements are specifically aimed at
changing the environmental context. While they may be declared
unconstitutional, the Court should not ignore the fact that a confined
examination of history and the right alone will have considerable
ramifications. It is long past time for courts and policymakers to take a
pragmatic approach to balancing protecting Second Amendment rights
and protecting the public. To limit the discussion of public health and
safety to a mere assertion that the state has an interest in protecting its
citizens does a disservice to the devastation that has taken place in this
country due to gun violence. Rather than continue to focus primarily
on the Second Amendment right, the constitutional debate must move
forward by properly balancing this right against the state’s undoubtedly
compelling interest in trying to stem the tide of gun violence to further
enable the safe enjoyment of other constitutional rights. Just as
individuals have the right to defend themselves, so, too, does the
community have the right to defend itself against this growing
epidemic. Restricting—as opposed to eliminating—the number of
firearms in public is a reasonable approach to a serious societal ill, and
one that a public health–law-influenced analysis demonstrates is clearly
constitutional and historically supported.

https://www.amnestyusa.org/press-releases/global-human-rights-movement-issues-travelwarning-for-the-u-s-due-to-rampant-gun-violence
[https://perma.cc/6EWP-FEYU].
The
organization described the gun violence epidemic in the United States as “a human rights crisis”
because the government is “willfully and systemically failing on multiple levels and ignoring its
international obligations to protect people’s rights and safety.” Id.
369 Branas, Jacoby & Andreyeva, supra note 339, at 334.
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